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THE MINNESOTA OPEN MEETING LAW AFTER TWENTY
YEARS-A SECOND LOOK
Over twenty years have passed since the Minnesota Legislature enacted
the Minnesota Open Meeting Law in 1957. During the two decades that
the law has been in effect, relatively few decisions of the Minnesota
Supreme Court have interpreted or applied the law's provisions. This
Note analyzes the law in light of these decisions and the decisions and
statutes of other jurisdictions, pointing out the weaknesses and
strengths of the Minnesota approach to the open meeting principle.
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BACKGROUND OF THE OPEN MEETING PRINCIPLE

The belief that the public is entitled to greater access to meetings of
government bodies has sparked the passage in all fifty states of statutes
that require certain public agencies to conduct all official meetings in
'
sessions open to the public.' Government "in the sunshine" pursuant
1. See ALA. CODE § 13-5-1 (1975); ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.62.310-.312 (1976); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 38-431 to -431.09 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 122801 to -2807 (1968 & Cum. Supp. 1977); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11120-11131 (West Cum.
Supp. 1979) (state agencies); id. §§ 54950-54961 (West 1966 & Cum. Supp. 1979) (local
agencies); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-6-401 to -402 (1973 & Cum.Supp. 1978); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 1-18a, -21 to -21k (West Cum. Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§
10001-10002, 10004-10005 (Cum. Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011 (West Cum.
Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-3301 to -3303, -9911 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1978); HAWAII
REV. STAT. §§ 92-1 to -13 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-2340 to -2347 (Cum.Supp. 1979); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 102, §§ 41-46 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 5-141.5-1 to -7 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1978); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 28A.1-.8 (West Cum.Supp. 1979STAT.
1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-4317 to -4320 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1978); Ky. REPV.
ANN. §§ 61.805-.850 (Baldwin Cum.Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:4.1-:10 (West
1965 & Cum.Supp. 1979); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 401-406 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 41, § 14 (1957); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, §§ 11A-11A/2 (West 1979); MICH.
375
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to these open meeting laws is the result of efforts of the press and
concerned citizen groups during the past few decades to gain admittance
3
to the decisionmaking processes of official bodies. Since 1950 when the
attention of journalists first focused upon the problem of government
secrecy through the Committee on Freedom of Information of the American Society of Newspaper Editors,' open meeting advocates have had
notable success in instilling their belief that the maintenance of a free,
democratic society necessitates providing access to information concerning government actions. 5
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.261-.275 (Supp. 1967-1979) (provisions requiring judiciary to
comply when engaged in rule-making or administrative activities held unconstitutional
in In re 1976 PA 267, 400 Mich. 660, 255 N.W.2d 635 (1977)); MINN. STAT. § 471.705 (1978);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 25-41-1 to -15 (Cum. Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 610.010-030
(Vernon Supp. 1953-1978); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-3-201 to -221 (1978), as amended by
Act of Mar. 29, 1979, ch. 380,*1979 Mont. Laws 877; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-1408 to -1414
(1976 & Cum. Supp. 1978); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 241.010-.040 (1977); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 91-A:1-:8 (1977 & Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:4-6 to -21 (West 1976 & Cum.
Supp. 1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-15-1 to -4 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1979); N.Y. PuB. OFF.
LAW §§ 95-106 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); N.C. GE. STAT. §§ 143-318.1-.7 (1978
& Supp. 1978); N.D. CENr. CODE § 44-04-19 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22 (Page
1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 301-314 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 192.610-.990 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 261-269 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979-1980);
R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 42-46-1 to -10 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1978); S.C. CODE §§ 30-4-20, -60 to
-110 (Cum. Supp. 1978); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 1-25-1 to -5 (1974); TENN. CODE: ANN.
§§ 8-4401 to -4406 (Cum. Supp. 1978); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 (Vernon
1970 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 52-4-1 to -9 (Supp. 1979); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 1, §§ 311-314 (1972 & Cum. Supp. 1978); VA. CODE §§ 2.1-340 to -346.1 (1979);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 42.30.010-.920 (1972 & Supp. 1978), as amended by Act of Mar.
19, 1979, ch. 42, 1979 Wash. Legis. Serv. 153 (West); W. VA. CODE §§ 6-9A-1 to -7 (1979
& Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.81-.98 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980); Wyo. STAT.
§§ 9-11-101 to -107 (1977).
2. Because of the increased openness that open meeting laws are said to foster, they
are frequently called "sunshine laws." See, e.g., Sloat, Government in the Sunshine Act:
A Danger of Overexposure, 14 H.Av. J. LEGIS. 620 (1977). Sunshine laws should not be
confused with sunset laws, which provide for the automatic termination of government
agencies after a stated period unless the agencies' enabling legislation is specifically renewed by the legislature. See generally Schwartz, Administrative Law: The Third
Century, 29 AD. L. REv. 291, 293-95 (1977).
3. See Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for the "Right to Know," 75
HARv. L. REv. 1199, 1199 (1962).
4. See Cross, Preface to H. CROSS, THE PEoPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW at xiv-xv (1953); Note,
supra note 3, at 1199. The Cross book was commissioned by the Society in 1951 to provide
it with a "comprehensive report on customs, laws and court decisions affecting our access
to public information." Cross, supra at xv. Although a reporter had authored a previous
study, the Society believed a legal analysis of the subject was necessary. See Pope,
Forward to H. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW at viii-xi (1953).
5. In 1952, only one state had an open meeting law. See Note, supra note 3, at 11991200. Ten years later, 26 states had such laws. Id. at 1199. Between 1962 and 1973, nine
more states had enacted laws. See Wickham, Let the Sunshine In! Open-Meeting Legislation Can Be Our Key to Closed Doors in State and Local Government, 68 Nw. U.L. REv.
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Proponents of the open meeting principle argue that freedom of information is fundamental to efficient government.6 If the people are excluded from official meetings of their government, proponents reason,
government officials are more likely to attempt to deceive their constituents, causing an increase in suspicion of, and a decrease of confidence
in, government action.7 Furthermore, opening deliberation of public
bodies encourages greater citizen input and criticism, leading to better
informed decisionmaking by official agencies. 8 In a practical vein, proponents also suggest that the public is better prepared to accept neces480, 480 n.2 (1973) (noting 35 states with open meeting laws). Today, all 50 states have
adopted open meeting legislation. See Sloat, supra note 2, at 621 n.8 (1977) (noting that
49 states have enacted open meeting laws since 1950, when only one state had such a law);
note 1 supra (listing statutes currently in effect).
6. See Wickham, supra note 5, at 481. A forceful expression favoring public access to
government was made by Harold Cross: "Public business is the public's business. The
people have the right to know. Freedom of information is their just heritage. Without that
the citizens of a democracy have but changed their kings." Cross, supra note 4, at xiii.
7. See Comment, Open Meeting Laws: An Analysis and Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 1151,
1161 (1974). The importance of open meetings in the political process was recognized by
the Florida Supreme Court in an early decision interpreting that state's sunshine law. The
court stated:
The right of the public to be present and to be heard during all phases of
enactments by boards and commissions is a source of strength in our country.
During past years tendencies toward secrecy in public affairs have been the
subject of extensive criticism. Terms such as managed news, secret meetings,
closed records, executive sessions, and study sessions have become synonymous
with "hanky panky" in the minds of public-spirited citizens. One purpose of the
Sunshine Law was to maintain the faith of the public in governmental agencies.
Regardless of their good intentions, these specified boards and commissions,
through devious ways, should not be allowed to deprive the public of this inalienable right to be present and to be heard at all deliberations wherein decisions
affecting the public are being made.
Board of Pub. Instruction v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693, 699 (Fla. 1969).
8. See Note, supra note 3,'at 1201. In Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473
(Fla. 1974), the Florida Supreme Court commented on the need for open meetings to
channel the public's views:
Every meeting of any board, commission, agency or authority of a municipality should be a marketplace of ideas, so that the governmental agency may have
sufficient input from the citizens who are going to be affected by the subsequent
action of the municipality. The ordinary taxpayer can no longer be led blindly
down the path of government, for the news media, by constantly reporting
community affairs, has made the taxpayer aware of governmental problems.
Government, more so now than ever before, should be responsive to the wishes
of the public. These wishes could never be known in nonpublic meetings, and
the governmental agencies would be deprived of the benefit of suggestions and
ideas which may be advanced by the knowledgeable public.
Also, such open meetings instill confidence in government. The taxpayer deserves an opportunity to express his views and have them considered in the
decision making process.
Id. at 475.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1979

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 3
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5

sary but unpopular decisions if it is aware of the policy options available
to public officials and if it is able to participate in the debate leading
to the final determination.'
Opponents of open meeting laws, looking to the effects of prohibiting
closed sessions, contend that press coverage of official deliberations
would be incomplete, inaccurate, and distorted due to the tendency of
the media to focus on sensational or controversial issues.'" Proponents,
on the other hand, point out that the open meeting principle ensures
more accurate reporting because the press is able to attend the meetings
and not rely on "leaked" information." Opponents also assert that public officials will indulge in more speechmaking and less decisionmaking
2
if they know that their meetings will be subject to public scrutiny.
Furthermore, public officials, according to the open meeting opponents,
will be less candid in open sessions and hence more likely to continue
advocating unpopular positions on issues because they are afraid of
appearing inconsistent. 3 An additional objection is found in the possibility of damaging the reputations and morale of public employees if
employee performance is discussed candidly in open meetings."' The
opponents' concerns have not prevented state legislatures from enacting
open meeting laws. Certain exceptions to the principle have been
recognized," perhaps in response to the legitimate objections of the
opponents, but the open meeting principle has been firmly established
in the United States."0
The open meeting principle has been the creature of legislation because neither the common law 7 nor the United States Constitution"
required government agencies to meet in open sessions. The common
9. See Note, supra note 3, at 1201.
10. See id. at 1202.
11. See id. at 1201.
12. See id. at 1202; Comment, supra note 7, at 1162 (prolonged unproductive meetings
could result when officials use open sessions to "grandstand for the benefit of constituents"). Similarly, public officals may prefer to remain silent on issues of which they are
ignorant than to appear unprepared. See Note, supra note 3, at 1202.
13. See Note, supra note 3, at 1202.
14. See Comment, supranote 7, at 1162. This objection may explain the preponderance
of statutes that permit individual employee performance to be discussed in private. See
generally note 127 infra (listing states with such exceptions).
15. See notes 127-67 infra and accompanying text (discussion of exceptions to open
meeting principle).
16. See note 5 supra.
17. See Parks, The Open Government Principle:Applying the Right to Know Under
the Constitution, 26 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 10-13 (1957); Note, supra note 3, at 1203.
18. See F. THAYER, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE PRESS § 30, at 178 (3d ed. 1956) (United
States Constitution does not grant right to collect news); Note, supra note 3, at 1204. See
generally Note, Access to Official Information: A Neglected ConstitutionalRight, 27 IND.
L.J. 209 (1952) (arguing that the first amendment requires open meetings of government
bodies).
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law rule is best illustrated by the practice of the English Parliament.
For many decades, Parliament denied nonmembers, or "strangers," access to its proceedings."9 When the primary motive for this policy-fear
of Crown reprisal-subsided in the late seventeenth century, Parliament
continued to hold its sessions in secret because Members preferred to
conceal the debate and vote on crucial matters from their constituents.'
Not until the nineteenth century, but solely by custom, were the press
and public granted entry to Parliamentary debates.' Legislative secrecy
was extended to the American colonies by the English.2 The press was
excluded from the meetings of colonial legislatures and prohibited from
publishing accounts of the proceedings they were permitted to attend.3
Secrecy also surrounded the sessions of the Constitutional Convention
when delegates resolved to conduct the convention behind closed
doors. 2 The United States Senate followed the tradition of secrecy,
holding debate in private until 1794.2 Today, Congress regularly meets
in sessions open to the public," but many major decisions are reached
in committee, an estimated two-thirds of which are closed to the public.? Although Congress has enacted a federal sunshine law, 2 it did not
19. See H. CRoss, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT To KNOW 180-81 (1953). In addition, severe
penalties were imposed for the publication of reports of Parliamentary proceedings. Id. at
181; Note, supra note 3, at 1203.
20. See H. CRoss, supra note 19, at 180; Note, supra note 3, at 1203; Comment, supra
note 7, at 1155.
21. See H. CRoss, supra note 19, at 181; Note, supra note 3, at 1203. Formerly, the press
and the public could be excluded upon the request of one Member of Parliament, but a
majority vote has been required for exclusion since 1874. See id. Although Parliament
presently encourages the reporting of its activities, see id.; Comment, supra note 7, at
1155, presence at its sessions remains a matter of grace and not of right. See H. CRoss,
supra note 19, at 181.
22. See Comment, supra note 7, at 1155-56. The author suggests that secrecy in government was one factor that precipitated the American Revolution. Id. at 1156.
23. See H. CRoss, supra note 19, at 182.
24. See Note, supra note 3, at 1202.
25. See id. at 1203; Comment, supra note 7, at 1156. The House of Representatives,
however, has convened publicly throughout its history. See Note, supra note 3, at 1203;
Comment, supra, at 1156.
26. See Comment, supra note 7, at 1156.
27. See Note, supra note 3, at 1203; cf. Comment, supra note 7, at 1157 (characterizing
Senate committee meetings as "shrouded in secrecy"). In 1974, 88% of the House committee meetings in which legislation was drafted held open sessions compared with only 80%
in 1973. See Comment, supra note 7, at 1156.
28. Government in the Sunshine Act § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976). The Act covers
agencies "headed by a collegial body composed of two or more individual members, a
majority of whom are appointed to such position by the president." Id., 5 U.S.C. §
552b(a)(1). This description encompasses only federal agencies, see Sloat, supra note 2,
at 625, including the CAB, ICC, FCC, FTC, NLRB, and SEC. See Common Cause, The
First Year of Sunshine: Federal Agency Compliance with the Government in the Sunshine
Act of 1976, at 23 app. (Aug. 1978). Agency compliance with the Act has generally been
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include itself within the scope of the law.
Constitutional arguments in favor of open meetings have been advanced by many commentators.n Contending that the primary rationale
behind the first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and a free
press was the belief that the people should be kept informed of the
operation of their government,10 commentators have sought a basis for
a first amendment right of access to government meetings and materials." No reported decision, however, has addressed this particular issue.
In several decisions concerning the freedom of the press to pursue matters in areas not generally open to the public such as prisons, the United
States Supreme Court has rejected arguments based on the right of the
media to collect news. 2 By analogy, the constitutional right of access to
government meetings is at best tenuous.
The responsibility for providing greater access to government meetings therefore passed to the legislatures.3 3 The results have been far from
uniform,' although the principle has been universally accepted. 5 The
less than exemplary. During the first full year of operation of the law, fewer than 40% of
the meetings of the 47 agencies were fully open to the public. Id. at 7. Three agencies, the
ICC, CAB, and TVA, have substantially complied with the federal sunshine law, but
seven agencies (Export-Import Bank, NLRB, Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission, United States Parole Commission, Federal Reserve Board, Commodity Future Trading Commission, and Federal Home Loan Bank Board) have displayed a particular lack of openness. See id. at 10-14.
For an analysis of the Act, see Sloat, supra note 2; Note, The Government in the
Sunshine Act-An Overview, 1977 DUKE L.J. 565 (1977); Comment, Government in the
Sunshine Act: Opening Federal Agency Meetings, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 154 (1976).
29. See, e.g., H. CRoss, supra note 19, at 31-32; Parks, supra note 17; Note, supra note
18.
30. See Parks, supra note 17, at 9-10; Note, supra note 18, at 212.
31. See Parks, supra note 17, at 10; Note, supra note 3, at 1204.
32. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (first amendment does not
compel government to release information); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974)
(Constitution does not impose upon government "the affirmative duty to make available
to journalists sources of information not available to members of the public generally");
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (noting, with apparent approval, that "the
press is regularly excluded from . . . the meetings of . . .official bodies gathering in
executive sessions"); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) ("The right to speak and
publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information."). These
decisions illustrate the principle that the right of the press to gather information does not
extend beyond the right of the general public to do the same. As Justice Douglas has
observed, however, "[tJhe press has a preferred position in our constitutional scheme,
not to enable it to make money, not to set newsmen apart as a favored class, but to bring
fulfillment to the public's right to know." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 721 (Douglas,
J., dissenting); see Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 841 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (average
citizen relies on free press for information about government activities).
33. See Note, supra note 3, at 1204.
34. One commentator has noted that:
Open meeting acts run the entire spectrum, from those which on their face
provide public access to governmental meetings almost without exception, to
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issues raised in interpreting the various open meeting laws do concern
some common areas. Three issues have provoked the most litigation:
first, what constitutes a meeting under the law; second, what is the
scope of the available exceptions from the law; and third, how can the
law be enforced to achieve its underlying purpose. A resolution of these
issues will determine the effectiveness of the open meeting principle in
a particular jurisdiction.
This Note will examine the Minnesota Open Meeting Law with respect to these and other issues, in light of the holdings of the Minnesota
Supreme Court, and with regard to the decisions and statutes in other
states. Rather than a practical analysis of the effect of the Minnesota
law upon the operation of government agencies within the state,3 6 this
Note will develop the legal theories and applications of the law to determine whether it is fulfilling its primary purpose of keeping government
open to the people.
II.

THE MINNESOTA OPEN MEETING LAW

Minnesota joined the movement for more open government in 1957
when the Minnesota Open Meeting Law was enacted.37 As originally
adopted, the law applied to all meetings of local governing bodies and
most of their subordinate boards and agencies. 38 State agencies were
conspicuously absent as was any provision for enforcing the law. A
minor change was made in 1967 when the requirement of recording
officials' votes on certain money appropriations was added.3 9 Sweeping
changes in the law occurred in 1973 when the statute was amended a
second time.' 0 Coverage was extended to state governmental entities and
those which grudgingly permit access to only the final actions taken by a few
specifically designated agencies. They vary from a few terse sentences to several
pages of fine print.
Wickham, supra note 5, at 482 (footnote omitted). See also Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MIcH. L. REv. 971, 1190 (1975) (state approaches to
implementation of open meeting principle have resulted in "considerable variation").
35. See note 1 supra.
36. Such a study was undertaken by the School of Public Affairs of the University of
Minnesota in 1976. See generally M. Gleeson, M. Schweiger & M. Bernardson, Effects of
the Minnesota Open Meeting Law on Local Governments (School of Pub. Affairs, Univ.
of Minn., Dec. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Effects of the Minnesota Open Meeting Law];
see also Bagley, Impact of the Sunshine Act on the Public's Access to Information and
on the Internal Operations of Government Agencies, 34 Bus. LAw. 1075 (1979) (general
discussion of effect of open meeting legislation).
37. See Act of Apr. 27, 1957, ch. 773, 1957 Minn. Laws 1043 (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 471.705(1) (1978)).
38. See id.
39. See Act of May 16, 1967, ch. 462, § 1, 1967 Minn. Laws 988 (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 471.705(1) (1978)).
40. See Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 680, 1973 Minn. Laws 1834 (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 471.705 (1978)).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1979

7

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 3
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5

all subordinate components of governing bodies and an enforcement
provision was added.' With these and other technical amendments,"
the current version of the Minnesota Open Meeting Law provides:
Subdivision 1. Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, all
meetings, including executive sessions, of any state agency, board,
commission or department when required or permitted by law to transact public business in a meeting, and the governing body of any school
district however organized, unorganized territory, county, city, town,
or other public body, and of any committee, subcommittee, board,
department or commission thereof, shall be open to the public, except
meetings of the board of pardons and the corrections board. The votes
of the members of such state agency, board, commission or department
or of such governing body, committee, subcommittee, board, department or commission on any action taken in a meeting herein required
to be open to the public shall be recorded in a journal kept for that
purpose, which journal shall be open to the public during all normal
business hours where such records are kept. The vote of each member
shall be recorded on each appropriation of money, except for payments
of judgments, claims and amounts fixed by statute. This section shall
not apply to any state agency, board, or commission when exercising
quasi-judicial functions involving disciplinary proceedings.
Subd. 2. Any person who violates subdivision 1 shall be subject to
personal liability in the form of a civil penalty in an amount not to
exceed $100 for a single occurrence. An action to enforce this penalty
may be brought by any person in any court of competent jurisdiction
where the administrative office of the governing body is located. Upon
a third violation by the same person connected with the same governing
body, such person shall forfeit any further right to serve on such governing body or in any other capacity with such public body for a period of
time equal to the term of office such person was then serving. The court
determining the merits of any action in connection with any alleged
third violation shall receive competent, relevant evidence in connection
therewith and, upon finding as to the occurrence of a separate third
violation, unrelated to the previous violations issue its order declaring
the position vacant and notify the appointing authority or clerk of the
governing body. As soon as practicable thereafter the appointing authority or the governing body shall fill the position as in the case of any
other vacancy.
41. See id. § 1, 1973 Minn. Laws 1835. The amendment also gave the statute its official
name. See id. § 3, 1973 Minn. Laws 1836 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 471.705(3)
(1978)).
42. See Act of June 2, 1975, ch. 271, § 6, 1975 Minn. Laws 742, 747 (directs revisor of

statutes to change name of corrections board throughout statutes); Act of May 24, 1973,
ch. 654, § 15, 1973 Minn. Laws 1729, 1739 (changing name of state parole, pardon boards);
Act of Apr. 19, 1973, ch. 123, art. V, § 7, 1973 Minn. Laws 209, 226 (changing villages to

cities).
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Subd. 3. This section may be cited as the "Minnesota Open Meeting
Law".

3

A. A Statement of Purpose
A statement of the purpose of the law is, according to one commentator, one of the three most important aspects in drafting open meeting
legislation." A clear statement of the legislature's reasons for opening
government deliberations and actions to public scrutiny, this commentator contends, leads to more effective application of the statute when
it is judicially construed. 5 Such a statement also reminds public officials that the open meeting principle cannot be ignored for the sake of
expediency." Many state legislatures, consistent with this observation,
have drafted purpose sections in their open meeting laws.47 A good example is found in Washington's Open Public Meeting Act:
The legislature finds and declares that all public commissions,
boards, councils, committees, subcommittees, departments, divisions,
offices, and all other public agencies of this state and subdivisions
thereof exist to aid in the conduct of the people's business. It is the
intent of this chapter that their actions be taken openly and that their
deliberations be conducted openly.
The people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies
which serve them. The people, in delegating authority do not give their
public servants the right to decide what is good for them to know and
43. MINN. STAT. § 471.705 (1978).
44. See Wickham, supra note 5, at 488. The other two principles relate to the need for
judicial discretion in drawing the line between public and private meetings, see id. at 494,
and for realistic enforcement provisions. See id. at 495.
45. See id. at 490, 494.
46. See Sullivan v. Credit River Township, 299 Minn. 170, 176, 217 N.W.2d 502, 506
(1974) ("In our judgment the people's right to know is too precious to yield to the claims
of a governing body that it is inconvenient or impractical to inform the public of its
meetings."); Comment, supra note 7, at 1163.
47. See ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.312 (1976); Amz. Rav. STAT. ANN.§ 38-431.09 (Cum. Supp.
1978-1979); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2802 (1968); CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11120, 54950 (West 1966
& Cum.Supp. 1979); COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-6-401 (1973); DEL.CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10001
(Cum. Supp. 1979); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 92-1 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 67-2340 (Cum. Supp.
1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, § 41 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 514-1.5-1 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1978); IowA CODE ANN. § 28A.1 (West Cum. Supp. 19791980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4317 (1977); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42:4.1 (West Cum.Supp.
1979); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 401 (1964); MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-41-1 (Cum.Supp.
1978); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-201 (1978); NEB. Rlv. STAT. § 84-1408 (1976); NEv. Rzv.
STAT. § 241.010 (1977); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:1 (Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
10-15-1(A) (Cum.Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.1 (Supp. 1978); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 25, § 302 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); OR. REv. STAT. § 192.620 (1977); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 42-46-1 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4401(a) (Cum.Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 52-4-1 (Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 311 (1972); VA. CODE § 2.1-340.1
(1979); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 42.30.010 (1972); W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-1 (1979); Wyo.
STAT.

§ 9-11-101 (1977).
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what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining
informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they
have created."
When the Minnesota Open Meeting Law was first enacted, the Legislature neglected to include a statement of purpose. Subsequent amendments have not remedied this omission. The absence of a statement of
purpose, however, has not prevented the Minnesota Supreme Court
from liberally construing the law or from expressing its understanding
of the law's purpose.
The main purpose of the Minnesota Open Meeting Law, according to
the Minnesota court, is to prohibit the taking of actions at secret meetings, where the public cannot become fully informed about a decision
or cannot detect improper influences. 0 Thus, the court has stated that
the law assures the public of its right to be informed 0 and to provide
the public with the opportunity to express its views. 51 The Minnesota
court's understanding of the open meeting principle is consistent with
the views taken by other courts. In other jurisdictions, courts have found
the purpose of the open meeting principle to include the prohibition
against star chamber sessions,52 the requirement for public bodies to
make decisions under public observation, 53 and the maintenance of the
54
people's faith in government.
Although a statement of legislative purpose would be a worthwhile
48. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 42.30.010 (1972). In the Government in the Sunshine Act,
Congress stated:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States that the public is
entitled to the fullest practicable information regarding the decisionmaking
processes of the Federal Government. It is the purpose of this Act to provide the
public with such information while protecting the rights of individuals and the
ability of the Government to carry out its responsibilities.
Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 2, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976).
49. See Lindahl v. Independent School Dist. No. 306, 270 Minn. 164, 167, 133 N.W.2d
23, 26 (1965). The court noted that while the law requires actions to be taken in the public
view, it does not require that actions be taken "in a place most advantageously suited for
public viewing." Id.
50. See Channel 10, Inc. v. Independent School Dist. No. 709, 298 Minn. 306, 313, 215
N.W.2d 814, 821 (1974).
51. See Sullivan v. Credit River Township, 299 Minn. 170, 175, 217 N.W.2d 502, 506
(1974) (quoting Op. Minn. Att'y Gen. No. 63a-5 (Feb. 2, 1972)).
52. See Dobrovolny v. Reinhardt, 173 N.W.2d 837, 840-41 (Iowa 1970).
53. See, e.g., Board of Pub. Instruction v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693, 699 (Fla. 1969); Olathe
Hosp. Foundation, Inc. v. Extendicare, Inc., 217 Kan. 546, 562, 539 P.2d 1, 15 (1975)
(purpose is "to make public every official's vote"); Raton Pub. Serv. Co. v. Hobbes, 76
N.M. 535, 538-39, 417 P.2d 32, 37 (1966); Noble v. Ternyik, 273 Or. 39, 44-45, 539 P.2d
658, 661 (1975).
54. See, e.g., Board of Pub. Instruction v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693, 699 (Fla. 1969);
McCarty v. Board of Regents, 231 Ga. 22, 23, 200 S.E.2d 117, 119 (1973) (law "seeks to
eliminate ... closed meetings which engender in the people a distrust of its officials").
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addition to the Minnesota Open Meeting Law, its absence does not
appear to affect the scope or application of the open meeting principle
in Minnesota. The basic premise behind the open meeting principle has
been adequately stated by the Minnesota Supreme Court. Mere enactment of the law may be sufficient to impress the principle upon the
public and public officials. Nevertheless, a clear statement of purpose,
such as is found in the Washington statute, would be a constant reminder that the open meeting principle is a fundamental characteristic
of a democratic society.
B.

Coverage

A major consideration faced by legislators in drafting open meeting
legislation is describing the government bodies and agencies to be covered by the law. The effectiveness of the open meeting principle can be
diluted if the description of the public bodies subject to the law is vague
or unclear.
To avoid a limiting construction of the open meeting law, many states
have attempted to define coverage as broadly as possible. Some statutes, for example, require every agency that performs a "government
function" to hold public meetings. 5 Other states extend coverage to all
bodies supported in whole or in part by public funds. 56 This approach
55. See ALA. CODE § 13-5-1 (1975) (any body to which legislative or judicial power is
delegated); COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-6-402(1) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (any body that discusses
public business or takes formal action); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3301(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978)
(meetings at which "official action" is taken); HAwAn REV. STAT. § 92-2(1) (1976) (bodies
required to conduct meetings and to take official action); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42:5 (West
Cum. Supp. 1979) (bodies with policymaking or administrative functions); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 11A (West 1979) (bodies that serve public purpose); MICH. CowP.
LAws ANN. § 15.262(a) (Supp. 1967-1979) (bodies empowered to exercise a "governmental
or proprietary authority or ... function"); NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1409(1) (1976) (subcommittees must be authorized to take "formal action" before law applies); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 91-A:1-a (Supp. 1977) (bodies transacting functions that affect citizens); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 10:4-8 (West 1976) (voting bodies that perform "public government function"); N.Y. Pus. OFF. LAw § 97(2) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (bodies that
perform governmental functions); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.2(b) (Supp. 1978) (bodies
that exercise legislative, policymaking, quasi-judicial, administrative, or advisory functions); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 261 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (includes bodies
created by any statute that states body is to perform "essential governmental function");
TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4402 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (bodies with authority to make decisions
or recommendations).
56. See ALA. CODE § 13-5-1 (1975) (bodies charged with duty of disbursing state funds);
ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310(a) (1976) (supported by or spending public funds); ARIz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 38-431(4) (Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (supported by or expending tax revenues);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2805 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (supported by or expending public funds);
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54952 (West 1966) (subordinate components of local agencies supported
by agency funds); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10002(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (bodies that
receive or expend public funds or make recommendations to such bodies); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 102, § 42 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979) (includes bodies supported by.tax revenue); KAN.
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appears to be the most inclusive provision employed in open meeting
laws. By basing coverage on the receipt or expenditure of public funds,
the open meeting law offers certain, workable criteria and a comprehensive standard by which to determine application of the law to a particular agency.17 The public funds approach, however, may be too inclusive.
Under it, the open meeting laws have been extended, rightly or wrongly,
to a city-owned utility corporation" and a private, nonprofit association
of colleges and secondary schools.59 Possibly because coverage was conceived to be too broad, the Virginia Legislature limited application of
the Virginia Freedom of Information Act to bodies "supported wholly
or principally by public funds."0
Despite the strengths of the public funds approach, greater certainty
is afforded by specifying the government bodies to which the open meeting laws apply. Minnesota has adopted this approach, stating expressly
in the law that meetings and executive sessions of the governing bodies
of school districts, counties, municipalities, or other public bodies
"required or permitted by law to transact public business in a meeting,"
must be open to the public."' The benefit of this approach lies in the
§ 75-4318(a) (Cum.Supp. 1978) (receiving, spending, or supported by public
funds); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42:5(A) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (receive or expend tax
funds); MIss. CODE ANN. § 25-41-3(a) (Cum.Supp. 1978) (supported by or expending
public funds); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-203(1) (1978) (supported by or expending public
funds); NEv. REy. STAT. § 241.015(2) (1977) (expending, supported by, or disbursing tax
revenues); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-19 (1978) (supported by or expending public funds);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 304(1) (West Cum.Supp. 1978-1979) (supported by or expending public funds or administering public property); S.C. CODE § 30-4-20(a) (Cum. Supp.
1978) (supported by or expending public funds); S.D. Comp. LAws § 1-25-1 (1974) (agencies created by statute or nontaxpaying and deriving revenue directly from public funds).
57. See Note, supra note 3, at 1205.
58. See Raton Pub. Serv. Co. v. Hobbes, 76 N.M. 535, 538-40, 417 P.2d 32, 33-36 (1966).
The court rejected the utility's argument that it was not involved in the use of public funds
because its income was derived from the sale of electric power because the utility was
required to transfer to the city treasury all funds not spent on operation or maintenance.
See id. at 540-41, 417 P.2d at 35.
59. See North Cent. Ass'n of Colleges & Schools v. Troutt Bros., 261 Ark. 378, 548
S.W.2d 825 (1977). The fact that the association chairman was a public employee and that
his secretary, also a public employee, performed certain jobs for the association and that
the association dues were paid by schools supported by public funds was the basis for the
court's decision, even though the association members otherwise served voluntarily and
without compensation. See id. at 379-81, 548 S.W.2d at 826.
60. See VA. CODE § 2.1-341(a) (1979).
61. MINN. STAT. § 471.705(1) (1978). This section, however, does not apply to any state
agency, board, or commission when exercising quasi-judicial powers with respect to disciplinary actions.
States with similar provisions that list or describe the public bodies covered by the
statute include: ALA. CODE § 13-5-1 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310(a) (1976); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-18a(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011 (West
Cum.Supp. 1979); IDAHO CODE § 67-2341(3) (Cum.Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102,
STAT. ANN.
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certainty it provides. Public officials cannot assert that the law was not
intended to cover their agency when this "shot-gun" approach has been
employed. More importantly, extensive enumeration provides guidelines for courts called upon to interpret the law. 2 The risk inherent in
every other statutory method-that courts will give the statute an interpretation more restrictive than intended by the legislature-is less likely
to occur. Finally, when a broad enumeration is employed, the legislature
is more prone to specify the public bodies not intended to be covered
by the law. Thus, in Minnesota, an express exception is provided for the
state board of pardons, the corrections board, and any body "exercising
3
quasi-judicial functions involving disciplinary proceedings.'
In addition to the express inclusion of every type of public body to
which the law applies, the Minnesota statute has another strong feature.
Subordinate components, such as committees, subcommittees, and4
boards of the public bodies covered by the law are expressly included.'
Were the statute less explicit, the risk would exist that courts would not
extend coverage to these subordinate parts of a public agency where
many of the important preliminary steps in government decisionmaking
are taken.' 5
Despite the expansive coverage of the Minnesota Open Meeting Law,
it has not been extended to the Legislature. The Minnesota Constitution
does require meetings of each house to be conducted in open sessions,"
but the same provision also permits the members to exclude the public
when secrecy is required." In a recent session, bills that would have
§ 42 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-2(a) (Burns Cure. Supp.
1978); IowA CODE ANN. § 28A.2(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980); Ky. Rav. STAT. ANN. §
61.805(2) (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1978); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42.5 (West Cum. Supp.
1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 11A (West 1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.010(2)
(Vernon Supp. 1953-1978); NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1409(1) (1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1015-1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1979); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 121.22(B)(1) (Page 1978); OR. REV.
STAT. § 192.610(4) (1977); R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-46-2(b) (1977); TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 6252-17(1)(c) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 312(a) (Cum.
Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 2.1-341(a) (1979); W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-2(6) (1979); WYo. STAT. §
9-11-102(a)(ii) (1977).
62. See Comment, Open Meetings in Virginia:Fortifying the Virginia Freedom of Information Act, 8 U. RICH. L. REv. 261, 263 (1974).
63. See MINN. STAT. § 471.705(1) (1978).
64. See id. Although the language in the statute literally applies solely to the subordinate components of municipal governments, the Minnesota Attorney General has indicated that subordinate components of state agencies are subject to the law. See Op. Minn.
Att'y Gen. 10-b (July 3, 1975) (advisory panels of state arts council required to conduct
open meetings).
65. Cf. Comment, supra note 62, at 265-66 (agencies should be prevented from using
committees as method of circumventing the statute).
66. See MINN. CONST. art. 4, § 14 ("Each house shall be open to the public during its
sessions except in cases which in its opinion require secrecy.").
67. See id.
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extended the open meeting principle to the Legislature were introduced,
but never advanced beyond committee."8
The Minnesota Legislature therefore has adopted the simplest but the
most precise approach to the issue of coverage. With enumeration of the
types of government bodies subject to the Minnesota Open Meeting
Law, the Legislature has foreclosed the possibility of controversy over
the basic question raised by open meeting laws.
C. Meetings
A more difficult issue than describing the government entities to be
included within the law is defining which meetings are required to be
open under the law. A definition of meeting must address two problems:
first, whether a particular formal meeting must be open and second,
whether a particular gathering of public officials is engaged in a meet68. Both H.F. 702, 70th Minn. Legis., 1977 Sess., introduced on March 3, 1977, see 1
MINN. H.R. JouR. 339 (1977), and H.F. 1167, 70th Minn. Legis., 1977 Sess., introduced
on March 30, 1977, see 1 MINN. H.R. Joua. 754 (1977), would have amended the Minnesota
Open Meeting Law by adding a clause requiring the Legislature and its committees,
subcommittees, and commissions to meet in public. Both bills, which were identical in
substance, were referred to the Committee on Rules and Legislative Administration, see
id. at 339, 754, but were never referred to the full House.
Meetings of legislatures in several states are required to be open to the public. See
ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310(a) (1976) (meetings of legislative bodies); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-18a(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (definition of agency includes any legislative office in
the state); IDAHO CODE § 67-2346 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (legislative committees required to
conduct open sessions); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-2(a)(1) (Burns Cum. Supp. 1978) (public agency includes any authority "by whatever name" that exercises legislative power);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4318(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (law applies unless displaced by House
or Senate rule); Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-41-3(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (special legislative
committees, but not subcommittees and conference committees, included); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 610.010(2) (Vernon Supp. 1953-1978) (any constitutional government entity included); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:l-a (Supp. 1977) (General Court and executive
sessions of committees included); N.M STAT. ANN. § 10-15-2 (1978) (separate section
applicable to legislature); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 261, 267 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 19791980) (General Assembly sessions, hearings to consider bills or to take testimony required
to be open); TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(2)(b) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979)
(legislature included); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 313(d) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (legislature
included within section limiting reasons for closed sessions); VA. CODE § 2.1-341(a) (1979)
(any legislative body included); W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-2(6) (1979) (any legislative body
included); cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.4(10) (1978) (committees of General Assembly
have inherent right to meet in executive sessions if in best interests of state or to prevent
"personal embarassment"); R.I. GE. LAws § 42-46-2(a) (1977) (any department of legislative branch); S.C. CODE § 30-40-80(b) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (legislative committees subject
to provisions requiring posting of meeting times). A few states have expressly excluded
legislatures from the acts. See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 92-10 (1976); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
61.810(9) (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1978) (committees of the General Assembly other than
standing committees exempt from law); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 11A (West
1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 241.015(2) (1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 304(1) (West Cum.
Supp. 1978-1979); Wvo. STAT. § 9-11-102(a)(ii) (1977).
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ing. Some legislatures have attempted to resolve these issues by inserting a definition of meeting in their open meeting statutes." A few of
69. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-431(3) (Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (gathering of quorum
to take legal action or to deliberate); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2803 (Cum. Supp. 1977)
("public meetings" are meetings of bodies supported by public funds); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 1-18a(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (any hearing or proceeding upon matters in
body's control or jurisdiction); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10002(e) (Cum. Supp. 1978)
(formal or informal gathering of quorum to discuss or act upon public business); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 92-2(3) (1976) (convening of quorum to take action or to deliberate over
matters in body's jurisdiction); IDAHO CODE § 67-2341 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (convening of
body to make or deliberate toward decision on any matter); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.52(c) (Burns Cum. Supp. 1978) (gathering of majority to take official action); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 28A.2(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (gathering of majority for deliberation or
action); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 61.805(1) (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1978) (all gatherings
including casual held in anticipation of regular meetings); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42:5(A)
(West Cum. Supp. 1979) (official convening); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 11A (West
1979) (corporal convening or deliberation for which quorum is required to render a decision); MIcH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 15.262(b) (Supp. 1967-1979) (convening of quorum to
deliberate toward or render a decision); MIss. CODE ANN. § 25-41-3(b) (Cum. Supp. 1978)
(assemblage of members at which official acts may be taken); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.010(3)
(Vernon Supp. 1953-1978) (meeting to discuss or decide public business or to form public
policy); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-202 (1978) (convening of quorum to hear, discuss, or act);
NEa. REv. STAT. § 84-1409(2) (1976) (all regular or special meetings to brief, discuss, or
act upon public business); NEv. REv. STAT. § 241.015(1) (1977) (gathering of quorum to
deliberate or make a decision); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:2(I) (Supp. 1977) (convening
of quorum to discuss or act); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-8(b) (West 1976) (gathering where
body acts on its public business); N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 97 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 19781979) (formal convening to transact public business); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.2(d)
(Supp. 1978) ("official meeting" is gathering of majority to conduct hearings, deliberations, or voting); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(B)(2) (Page 1978) (prearranged discussions); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 304(2)-(6) (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (definitions
of regularly scheduled, special, and emergency meetings; generally, persons conducting
business as a unit); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.610(5) (1977) (convening for which quorum is
needed to make a decision or to deliberate); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 262 (Purdon Cum.
Supp. 1979-1980) ("public meetings" are meetings or hearings at which formal action is
scheduled or taken); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-46-2(a) (1977) (convening to discuss or act
formally upon matters in body's jurisdiction); S.C. CODE § 30-4-20(d) (Cum. Supp. 1978)
(convening of quorum to discuss or act upon matters within body's jurisdiction); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 8-4402 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (convening of body for which quorum is required
to make decision); TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(1)(a) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 19781979) (deliberations between a quorum at which public business is discussed); VA. CODE
§ 2.1-341(a) (1979) (meetings as a body or informal gatherings of quorum or three members, whichever is less); W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-2(4) (1979) (convening for which a quorum
is necessary to make decisions); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.82(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980)
(convening of members for purpose of exercising responsibilities vested in body); Wvo.
STAT. § 9-11-102(a)(iii) (1977) (assembly at which action is taken).
70. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-431 (Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) ("legal action"); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 286.011(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) ("official acts"); GA. CODE ANN. § 403301(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978) ("official actions"); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-2(c)-(d) (Burns
Cum. Supp. 1978) ("official actions"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-41-3(b) (Cum. Supp. 1978)
("official acts"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 262 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) ("formal
action").
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these statutes simply define a meeting as a gathering in which a government agency takes official action. 0 Far more prevalent, however, are
statutes that encompass deliberation as well as action. 7 Other statutes
focus upon the number of members of a public agency present at a
gathering, such as a majority" or a quorum, 73 as the determinative factor
in defining meetings subject to the open meeting requirement.
None of these approaches offers a final solution to the problem. The
California 4 and Florida75 open meeting laws, for example, are "official
action" meeting statutes. Courts in those states initially applied the
laws restrictively, only to meetings in which formal action, such as
voting, took place." The weakness of this approach is that it allows
71. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-18a(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 29, § 10002(e) (Cum. Supp. 1978); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 92-2(3) (1976); IDAHO CODE §
67-2341 (Cum. Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, § 42 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1979);
IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-2(d) (Burns Cum. Supp. 1978); IOWA CODE ANN. § 28A.2(2)
(West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 61.805(1) (Baldwin Cum. Supp.
1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
30A, § 11A (West 1979); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 15.262(b) (Supp. 1967-1979); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 610.010(3) (Vernon Supp. 1953-1978); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-202 (1978); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 84-1409(2) (1976); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:2 (Supp. 1977); N.Y. PUB.
OFF. LAW § 97 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 149-318.2(d) (Supp.
1978); OR. REv. STAT. § 192.610(5) (1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-46-2(a) (1977); S.C. ConE
§ 30-4-20(d) (Cum. Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4402 (Cum. Supp. 1978); TEx. REv.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(1)(a) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); W. VA. CODE § 6-9A2(4) (1979).
72. See IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-2(c) (Burns Cum. Supp. 1978); IOWA CODE ANN. §
28A.2(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.2(d) (Supp. 1978);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 121.22(B)(2) (Page 1978); cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-8 (West 1976)
(meeting defined to include gatherings of less than a majority).
73. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-431 (Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-18a(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10002(e) (Cum. Supp.
1978); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 92-2(3) (1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 11A (West
1979) (meeting defined as gathering for which quorum is necessary to render a decision);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.262(b) (Supp. 1967-1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-202
(1978); NEV. REv. STAT. § 241.015(1) (1977); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:2(I) (Supp.
1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-15-1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1979); OR. REv. STAT. § 192.610(5)
(1977) (provision similar to Massachusetts); S.C. CODE § 30-4-20(d)-(e) (Cum. Supp.
1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4402 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (provision similar to Massachusetts);
TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(1)(a) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); VA. CODE
§ 2.1-341(a) (1979) (gathering of three or more or of a quorum, if less than three); W. VA.
CODE § 6-9A-2(4) (1979) (provision similar to Massachusetts).
74. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11122, 54952.6 (West 1966 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
75. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
76. See Adler v. City Council, 184 Cal. App. 2d 753, 770, 7 Cal. Rptr. 805, 81W (1960)
(open meeting law "not directed at anything less than a formal meeting"); Turk v. Richard, 47 So. 2d 543, 544 (Fla. 1950) (meetings are "formal assemblages of [members of
a public agency] sitting as a joint deliberative body"). Courts in other jurisdictions have
reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Waters v. City of Birmingham, 282 Ala. 104, 10910, 209 So. 2d 388, 393 (1968) (discussions held prior to formal meeting not subject to open
meeting law even though agenda discussed); Selkowe v. Bean, 109 N.H. 247, 249-50, 249
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public officials to conduct "rerun" voting in public after reaching decisions in private." Indeed, under such a restrictive application, little
need exists for an open meeting statute because the public could discover how officials voted under an open record law."5
Later, the California and Florida courts broadened the scope of their
statutes by applying them to meetings at which official action or deliberation occurred.7" The Florida Supreme Court concluded, after an appellate court applied the law to all phases of the decisionmaking process,80 that the statute was intended to cover those meetings at which
public officials discuss matters that foreseeably would result in the taking of official action.8 ' The "foreseeable action" standard, the supreme
court believed, would encompass a greater number of meetings than an
"official action" standard.82
The Minnesota Open Meeting Law contains no definition of meeting
and the Minnesota court has yet to fashion a definitive standard by
which to determine if a particular gathering of public officials is included within the statute. In several cases, the court has emphasized
that the opportunity for public input is an important factor to be considA.2d 35, 36-37 (1969) (no violation of open meeting law when city council finance committee met in private to discuss city budget but did not take any action on budget); Schults
v. Board of Educ., 86 N.J. Super. 29, 46-47, 205 A.2d 762, 772 (App. Div.) (closed session
did not violate open meeting law because agency took no final action during session), aff'd,
45 N.J. 2, 210 A.2d 762 (1964); Beacon J. Publishing Co. v. City of Akron, 3 Ohio St. 2d
191, 198-99, 209 N.E.2d 399, 404-05 (1965) (only meetings in which resolutions, rules,
regulations, or other formal matters are adopted are subject to open meeting law).
77. See Wickham, supra note 5, at 492-93.
78. See Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470, 473-74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1969) (legislature must have intended more in open meeting law than merely permitting
public to attend meetings involving official action or formal voting because formal agency
actions are "matters of record and easily ascertainable").
79. See Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors, 263
Cal. App. 2d 41, 47-51, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480, 485-87 (1968); Board of Pub. Instruction v.
Doran, 224 So. 2d 696, 698 (Fla. 1969). The California court identified "deliberation and
action as dual components of the collective decision making process." 263 Cal. App. 2d
at 47, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 485. Thus, the process includes preliminary factfinding as well as
the ultimate decisionmaking. See id. at 47-48, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 485. In order to prevent
the emasculation of the legislative intent as embodied in the state's open meeting law,
the court held that the statute "extends to informal sessions or conferences of the board
members designed for the discussion of public business." Id. at 51, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
In the Sacramento Newspaper Guild case, an Elks Club luncheon attended by the county
board of supervisors was found to be a meeting within the terms of the statute. See id.
80. See Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
The court reasoned that each stage of the decisionmaking process, from discussion to
formal action, is an integral element of the ultimate "action." See id. at 473-74.
81. See Board of Pub. Instruction v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 696, 698 (Fla. 1969). For a more
detailed discussion of the foreseeable action test, see Note, Government in the Sunshine:
JudicialApplicationand Suggestions for Reform, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. Rv. 537, 538-42 (1974).
82. See 224 So. 2d at 698.
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ered in determining whether a specific meeting should be open to the
public. 3 Meetings held outside the territorial confines of a school district, 4 for example, have been condemned as violations of the law, as
have special meetings held without prior notice to the public.8 5 In
Lindahl v. Independent School DistrictNo. 306,16 on the other hand, the
court found no violation of the Minnesota law in a situation clearly
within the purview of an "official action" statute. Lindahl involved a
school board meeting held in the superintendent's office immediately
following public discussion of a proposed bond issue. 7 Because the public had had an opportunity to express its views at the public meeting
and because the court found no evidence of devious motives in the
board's adjourning to the superintendent's office, the court held that the
meeting was in compliance with the law.88 The court cautioned, however, that failure to invite the public to such a meeting might be a more
important consideration in other circumstances9
The result of the Minnesota court's pragmatic approach is to force
public officials to justify closing a meeting, which may act as a deterrent
to violations of the law. The approaches discussed above are useful in
determining when an agency is required to open its regular formal meetings to the public. Less clear, however, is the standard to be used in
determining when informal gatherings must be open. The states that
have adopted the quorum or majority approach to the open meeting law
have attempted to resolve this problem by referring to the number of
officials present at a particular gathering. This approach is sound because it requires meetings to be open when a possibility of official action
exists. Less clear are situations in which officials encounter one another
in less formal surroundings. In such situations, the public's need for
access to government must be balanced with the speech and associational rights of public officials. 0 Purely social gatherings of public offi83. See notes 49-51 supra and accompanying text.
84. See Quast v. Knutson, 276 Minn. 340, 150 N.W.2d 199 (1967). But see Op. Minn.
Att'y Gen. 434-b-2 (Feb. 13, 1973) (town board meetings may be held outside township
when no suitable meeting place existed in township).
85. See Sullivan v. Credit River Township, 299 Minn. 170, 174, 217 N.W.2d 502, 505
(1974) ("The language of the statute directing that meetings be open to the public is
meaningless if the public has no knowledge that the meeting is to take place.").
86. 270 Minn. 164, 133 N.W.2d 23 (1965).
87. See id. at 167, 133 N.W.2d at 26.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 167-68, 133 N.W.2d at 26. The court noted that the plaintiff had failed
to introduce sufficient evidence of the board's intent to conceal deliberations and bar
spectators, indicating that the burden of proving a violation is on the party who challenges
a public body's compliance with the law and will not be complicated by an apparent
presumption that the body has acted lawfully. See id. at 168, 133 N.W.2d at 26.
90. See Little & Tompkins, Open Government Laws: An Insider's View, 53 N.C.L. Rlv.
451, 462-73 (1975) (analyzing the constitutional rights of public officials against the open
meeting policy in four hypothetical situations).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol5/iss2/3

18

et al.: The Minnesota Open Meeting Law After Twenty Years—A Second Look
MINNESOTA OPEN MEETING LAW

19791

cials, for example, should not be subject to open meeting legislation
because even public officials have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in such circumstances.' This viewpoint is reflected in a number of statutes that specifically exempt social gatherings or chance encounters
between officials from coverage. 2 The distinction between an official's
private and public life is less clear in other circumstances, however. For
example, one member of a five-member city council in a small Minnesota city may encounter a fellow council member at a local cafe. Besides
discussing the weather, the two briefly discuss some general council
matters. Does this encounter and the ensuing discussion about council
matters constitute a meeting subject to the Minnesota Open Meeting
Law? Although the court has not yet answered this question, the Attorney General, in what has become a controversial opinion, indicated in
1974 that such an encounter would be a meeting within the meaning of
the statute. 3 A gathering, however informal, of less than a quorum of a
public body, the Attorney General observed, "might well subvert the
law's purposes just as effectively as a deliberation between a quorum or

more.

4

91. See Channel 10, Inc. v. Independent School Dist. No. 709, 298 Minn. 306, 325, 215
N.W.2d 814, 827 (1974) ("strict social get-together" at which no public business is discussed "obviously" outside open meeting law); Comment, supra note 7, at 1170 (members
of public bodies should be allowed private social lives during nonworking hours).
92. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-6-402(2.1) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (if discussion of public
business is not "central purpose" of chance meeting or social encounter); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 1-18a(e) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (if no plan or intent to discuss public
business); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 92-5(b) (1976) (if no official business is discussed); IND.
CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-2(c)(i) (Bums Cum. Supp. 1978) (if no intent to avoid law); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 28A.2(2) (West Cum. Supp. .1979-1980) (gatherings for purely ministerial or
social purposes excluded if no discussions of public business take place and if not intended
to violate law); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 30A, § 11A/2 (West 1979) (if no final agreement
is reached and if not in circumvention of spirit of law); Mic. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §
15.263(10) (Supp. 1967-1979) (if not designed to avoid statute); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143318.2(d) (Supp. 1978) (unless evades spirit of law); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 306 (West
Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (informal gatherings excluded if not intended to circumvent law);
S.C. CODE § 30-4-70(c) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (if not intended to circumvent spirit of law);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4402 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (if not used to decide business in circumvention of spirit of law); TEx. REV. CrV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(1)(a) (Vernon Cum. Supp.
1978-1979) (social functions excluded if unrelated to public business or if no discussions
are held); VA. CODE § 2.1-341(a) (1979) (if no purpose to evade law); WIs. STAT. ANN. §
19.82(2) (West. Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (if not intended to circumvent spirit of law). But
cf. K Y. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.805(1) (Baldwin Cune. Supp. 1978) (meeting includes casual
gathering held in anticipation or conjunction with regular meeting).
The Wisconsin law takes the position that if half or more of the members of a public
body meet, a rebuttable presumption is created that the meeting is for the purpose of
exercising the body's responsibilities and hence must be open to the public. See Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 19.82(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980). A different approach is indicated by the
Colorado law, which requires all meetings between two or more members of a public body
to be open. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-402(1) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
93. See Op. Minn. Att'y Gen. 63-a-5 (Oct. 28, 1974).
94. Id.
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The Attorney General's interpretation may be unreasonably restrictive because it makes the law applicable to what, in the hypothetical
situation outlined above, is essentially a chance encounter between colleagues who might naturally discuss a common interest, their council
work. 5 Informal exchanges between officials may be necessary to generate ideas and policy alternatives and should be exempted from the open
meeting requirement." Restricting discussion among officials to open
meetings may actually be detrimental to the public interest because
officials may not examine issues as fully or candidly in public as they
might in discussions among themselves.97
On the other hand, private discussions among officials of different
public bodies, the Attorney General recently concluded, may not be,
under some circumstances, a meeting subject to the law." The Attorney
General observed that "private deliberations among members of the
same body could result in decisions being reached by the membership
as a whole-or by a number of members sufficient to affect the result
of an action-without the public being aware of the reasons the members have presented to one another for favoring or rejecting the action."9
This possibility, the Attorney General reasoned, is not ordinarily present when a member of one public body meets with a member of another
public body.' ® Such meetings therefore were not required to be conducted in public. The Attorney General cautioned, however, that if
these kinds of encounters were used to circumvent the law-for example, by using a nonmember as an intermediary between members of one
public body-they may violate the open meeting law.'
Public officials reported in a survey conducted in 1976 that the number of private discussions between officials had remained about the
same since the Attorney General's 1974 opinion declared such discussions subject to the law.90 Some officials, particularly in large cities and
large school districts, did report a decrease in the number of private
95. The Attorney General noted that the Channel 10 court had indicated that chance
encounters were outside the law if no public business was discussed. The Attorney General's opinion addressed the consequences when public business was discussed. See id.
96. See Little & Tompkins, supra note 90, at 473; Wickham, supra note 5, at 481.
97. See Little & Tompkins, supra note 90, at 473.
98. See Op. Minn. Att'y Gen. 471-e (May 23, 1978).
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See Effects of the Minnesota Open Meeting Law, supra note 36. A questionnaire
was mailed to elected and appointed officials, newspaper editors, and the League of
Women Voters in a random sample of local jurisdictions representing 60 counties, 60 cities,
and 60 school districts. Id. at 1. Responses were received from 40% of the individuals
surveyed and from 94% of the 180 jurisdictions. Id. at b-3. Follow-up interviews were
conducted with 22 public officials, 20 representatives of the news media, and 13 members
of the League of Women Voters. Id. at b-4.
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1
but the great majority of elected officials reported that
discussions, '1
of
such private discussions actually had increased.10
the number
Because deliberations by public officials are important to the policymaking process of public bodies, an open meeting law must include such
deliberations within its coverage if the law is to be effective. Valid arguments, however, can be made that the public interest is better served if'
discussions about certain public matters are held behind closed doors." 5
Despite the validity of such arguments, however, it is not difficult to
conclude that some public officials simply prefer private discussions to
public deliberations because they find it more convenient and less politically and personally embarrassing to discuss some public matters privately.' Only a clear definition of the term "meeting" would prevent
these officials from circumventing the law and undercutting the purpose
of the law.

D. Notice
To enable the public to exercise its rights under open meeting laws,
notice of the time and place for meetings appears to be a necessary
provision. Although many states have enacted notice requirements,' 07
103. Id. at 5.
104. Id.

105. See, e.g., Kalil, Is Florida Sunshine the Most Powerful of Disinfectants?, 49 FLA.
B.J. 72, 77 (1975) (exception should be allowed for staff meetings because "work product
or preliminary deliberations . . . could be more efficiently and effectively accomplished"); Little & Tompkins, supranote 90, at 452, 478 (need to collect data and information on an informal basis justifies certain exclusions from open meeting laws); Markham,
Sunshine on the Administrative Process: Wherein Lies the Shade, 28 An. L. Rv. 463, 468
(1976) (officials should be permitted to form policy in private sessions before inviting
public comment); cf. Wickham, supra note 5, at 485 (exception for personnel management
may be explained by need for efficiency in operation).
106. See Sullivan v. Credit River Township, 299 Minn. 170, 176, 217 N.W.2d 502, 506
(1974) (court refused to "yield" to argument that public officials find closed meetings
more practical than open meetings); Markham, supra note 105, at 472-74 (noting that
public official who objects to open meetings may "simply be unfit for governmental
service").
107. See ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310(e) (1976) (reasonable notice required); Aouz. Rv.
STAT. ANN. § 38-431.02 (Cum.Supp. 1978-1979) (24-hour notice required to be posted at
places agency has specified in notice filed with Secretary of State); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 122805 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (notice required only for emergency or special meetings); CAL.
Gov'T CODE §§ 11125, 54954.1 (West 1966 & Cum. Supp. 1979) (notice required to be
mailed to requesting property owners or other persons); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-402(2)
(Cum.Supp. 1978) ("full and timely notice to the public" required); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
29, § 10004(e) (Cum.Supp. 1978) (seven days conspicuous notice at agency's principal
office required for regular meetings); HAwAn REV. STAT. § 92-7 (1976) (72-hour public
notice required for all regular, special, or rescheduled meetings); IDAHO CODE § 67-2343
(Cum.Supp. 1979) (notice required for all executive sessions and generally for special
meetings); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, § 42.02 (Smith-Hurd Cum.Supp. 1979) (annual filing
of schedule for regular meetings required; 24-hour posting at principal office required for
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several states, Minnesota among them, neglected to adopt notice provisions in their open meeting laws. The notice requirements that are required by statute in other states range from simple provisions directing
that reasonable notice of meetings be given"' to extensive provisions
special or rescheduled meetings); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-5 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1978)
(annual filing of schedule of regular meetings required; 48-hour notice for rescheduled
meetings); IOWA CODE ANN. § 28A.4 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (24-hour reasonable
notice of time, place, and date); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4318(b) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (notice
to requesting persons); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.820, .825 (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1978)
(regular schedule of meetings required to be set by agency rule; 24-hour notice to requesting persons for special meetings); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:7 (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (24hour notice for all meetings unless agency follows regular schedule); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 30A, § 11AI/2 (West 1979) (48-hour posted notice and filing with Secretary of
State); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN §§ 15.264-.266 (Supp. 1967-1979) (public posting at
agency's principal office required); Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-41-13(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978)
(agency required to determine procedures for giving notice); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.020
(Vernon Supp. 1953-1978) (agency required to adopt reasonable methods of giving notice);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1411 (1976) ("reasonable advance publicized notice" required); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 241.020(2)-(3) (1977) (three working days notice required; minimum notice
defined to be posting at public office and three other places); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91A:2(II) (Supp. 1977) (24-hour posted notice); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-9(a) (West 1976)
(adequate notice required); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-15-1(C) (Cum. Supp. 1979) (agencies
to determine reasonable notice annually); N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 99 (McKinney Cum.
Supp. 1978-1979) (72-hour notice required for all meetings that are scheduled a week in
advance); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.8 (Supp. 1978) (regular schedule required to be filed;
changes require 48-hour notice); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(F) (Page 1978) (public
bodies required to establish reasonable methods of giving notice); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
25, §§ 303, 311 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (regular schedule required to be filed; 10day notice for any changes); OR. REv. STAT. § 192.640 (1977) (notice "reasonably calculated to give actual notice to interested persons" required); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §
265(a)-(c) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (annual public notice by posting and publication required for regular meetings; 24-hour notice for special or rescheduled meetings); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 42-46-6 (1977) (annual posting or posting within 24 hours of meetings required); S.C. CODE § 30-4-80 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (posting at principal office at least 24
hours prior to regular or special meeting and effort to notify media of all meetings required); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4403 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (adequate public notice required);
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(3A) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (72-hour
posted notice required); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 312(c) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (designation
in agency regulations required); VA. CODE § 2.1-343 (1979) (notice to requesting persons
required); W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-3 (1979) (agency rule to designate); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.84
(West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (24-hour notice required); Wvo. STAT. § 9-11-104 (1977)
(agency must provide for notice by rule).
108. See Hough v. Stembridge, 278 So. 2d 288, 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (holding
that Florida law required "reasonable notice" although law contained no express provision); ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310(e) (1976) (reasonable public notice required); AIz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 38-431.02 (Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) ("reasonable and practicable notice"
required); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-402(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978) ("full and timely notice");
IOWA CODE ANN. § 28A.4(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (notice "reasonably calculated
to apprise public" of meeting); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.020 (Vernon Supp. 1953-1978)
("reasonable method of notification" required for special meetings); NEB. REV. STAT. § 841411(1) (1976) ("reasonable advance publicized notice"); NEv. REv. STAT. § 241.020(3)
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that detail what the notice must state and where it must be posted."'
Several states do not require agencies to give notice of' regular meetings"0 and others waive the requirement for emergency meetings"' or
merely direct that notice "appropriate to the circumstances" be given." '
Relaxation of notice requirements for emergency meetings may be a
disservice to the public. Notice may be more critical for emergency
meetings than for regular meetings because of the probable importance
of the matters to be discussed." 3 A better approach than exempting
(1977) (minimum public notice required); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(F) (Page 1978)
(notice by a reasonable method); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4403(a)-(b) (Cum. Supp. 1978)
("adequate public notice"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 312(c)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (notice
must be "clearly designated" by agency rule).
109. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, §§ 42.02, .03 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1979)
(regular meeting schedule required to be prepared; must give 10 days notice for any
changes; public notice of special or rescheduled meetings required to be posted at principal office 24 hours in advance of meeting and sent to requesting media); TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(3A) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (date, hour, place, and
subject matter required to be posted in places specified by statute for state agencies,
county agencies, and school districts; 72-hour notice required for all meetings except for
emergency meetings, when two hours is sufficient).
110. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2805 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (notice provision applies only
to special or emergency meetings); IDAHO CODE § 67-2343 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (notice
required only for executive sessions or special meetings); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.020 (Vernon Supp. 1953-1978) (no notice required for regular meetings established by agency rule).
111. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21 (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (no notice required
for emergency meetings, but minutes must. be filed with Secretary of State or clerk of
county or city); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10004(e)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (no notice
required if meeting is "necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace,
health or safety"); IDAHO CODE § 67-2343 (Cum. Supp. 1979); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
61.825(2) (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1978) (if notice is impractical); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 30A, § 11A/2 (West 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1411(3) (1976) (if necessary); NEV.
REv. STAT. § 241.020(2), (4) (1977) (if immediate action required); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65,
§ 265(e) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (if clear and present danger to life or property);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-46-9(c) (1977) (if necessary to public interest); S.C. CODE § 30-4-80(a)
(Cum. Supp. 1978); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 42.30.080 (1972) (if actual or likely injury
to person or property would result); W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-3 (1979) (if "immediate official
action" is required).
112. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-431.02(D) (Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (appropriate
notice); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 92-8 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 67-2343 (Cum. Supp. 1979); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 28A.4 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) ("reasonably possible" notice); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 42:7(A) (West Cum. Supp. 1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:2(11) (Supp.
1977) ("whatever means are available"); N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 99 (McKinney Cum. Supp.
1978-1979) (notice within reasonable time, to extent practicable); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143318.8(b)(3) (Supp. 1978) (must give notice to requesting media); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
121.22(F) (Page 1978) (immediate notice to requesting media); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25,
§ 311(12) (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (notice that is reasonable and possible under the
circumstances); OR. REv. STAT. § 192.640 (1977) (notice "appropriate to the circumstances"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 312(c)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1978) ("some public notice" required); WYo. STAT. § 9-11-104(d) (1977) (must make reasonable effort to give notice).
113. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Credit River Township, 299 Minn. 170, 178, 217 N.W.2d 502,
508 (1974) (Yetka, J., concurring specially) ("Matters of extreme importance are as likely,
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emergency meetings from notice requirements is to provide a different
notice procedure for these meetings. In Arkansas, for example, public
agencies are directed to give two hours notice to the media prior to
conducting an emergency or special meeting." 4 Some form of special
notice for emergency meetings affords the public the opportunity to
attend the meetings, in person or through representatives, without infringing upon the responsibility of public officials to respond quickly to
emergency situations.
The Minnesota Supreme Court attempted to remedy the Legislature's
omission of any notice provisions in the Minnesota Open Meeting Law
in Sullivan v. Credit River Township."5 Adequate notice of the time and
place for meetings, the court held, was necessarily implied from the
terms of the statute."' The court left the type and timing of notice to
the reasonable discretion of the affected agencies,"' but did offer some
guidelines. First, the court stated that notice of regularly scheduled
meetings need not be given if the public can determine the times, dates,
and locations through reasonable inquiry."' Second, published notice is
not essential, even for special meetings, if notice is posted at predesignated locations." 9 Finally, prior notice of all meetings is required unless
the meeting qualifies as an emergency. 2 0 The agencies are free to decide
when an emergency is present, subject to the duty to consider "whether
indeed perhaps more likely, to come up at emergency meetings than at regular meetings.").
114. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2805 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (but only if media has requested
to be notified). See also IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-5(d) (Burns Cum. Supp. 1978) (notice
by posting and to media who have requested to be notified required prior to holding
emergency meeting); TEX. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(3A)(h) (Vernon Cum. Supp.
1978-1979) (two-hour notice required); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.84(3) (West Cum. Supp. 19791980) (two-hour notice required when 24-hour notice is impossible or impractical).
115. 299 Minn. 170, 217 N.W.2d 502 (1974).
116. See id. at 174, 217 N.W.2d at 505-06. The court based its conclusion on the general
rule of statutory construction that every statute is understood to contain, by implication,
those provisions necessary to effect its purposes. See id. at 174, 217 N.W.2d at 505.
Without a notice provision, the statutory purpose of the Minnesota Open Meeting Law
would be meaningless. See id. Courts in other states have come to similar conclusions.
See, e.g., Barnes v. City of New Haven, 140 Conn. 8, 20, 98 A.2d 523, 529 (1953) (act
requiring open meetings of a municipal parking authority required authority to give reasonable notice to the public, although act did not entitle public to participate in discussions); Hough v. Stembridge, 278 So. 2d 288, 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (public
meeting would not be "public" without necessity of giving notice). But see Harms v.
Adams, 238 Ga. 186, 232 S.E.2d 61 (1977) (law deals with openness, not notice).
117. See 299 Minn. at 174, 217 N.W.2d at 506.
118. See id. Additional notice of adjourned meetings likewise was unnecessary. See id.
119. See id. at 174-75, 217 N.W.2d at 506. Because "the public [must have] a reasonable opportunity to be aware of the places in which such notices are posted," id. at 175,
217 N.W.2d at 506, changing the location for posting notices would require, at the least,
notice of the new location posted at the old location.
120. See id. at 175, 217 N.W.2d at 506.
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the situation calls for immediate action involving the protection of the
public peace, health, or safety."''
The court's guidelines appear to provide the public with sufficient
notice of agency meetings. Constructive notice of regular meetings, in
the absence of a statutory mandate, is not unreasonable when the
agency meets on a set schedule at the same location. Requiring publication of notice for regular or special meetings, the times and locations of
which may be determined with little effort, would have imposed an
unnecessary expense upon the agencies. As the concurring opinion remarked in Sullivan, however, requiring notice for special meetings but
not regular meetings may be inconsistent with the open meeting statute,
which applies on its face to every meeting of the affected government
bodies. 2 2 Even less satisfactory is the lack of any notice requirement for
emergency meetings. 22 Coupling the discretion to determine when an
emergency exists with an absence of any prior notice requirement may
tempt some public officials to make sham determinations of emergencies in order to conduct public business privately.2 4 Nevertheless, the
court's imposition of notice requirements on the open meeting statute
filled a void left by the Legislature.
The failure of the court to prescribe notice requirements for all meet121. Id. The court noted that its guidelines were consistent with those adopted by the
Minnesota Attorney General. In Op. Minn. Att'y Gen. No. 63a-5 (Jan. 11, 1972), the
Minnesota Open Meeting Law was interpreted to require that notice be given to the public
of a special meeting of the Faribault City Council. The Attorney General, like the Sullivan
court, left the type and timing of notice to the city council and did not require giving notice
for emergency meetings. Regularly scheduled meetings were exempt from the notice requirement because "the public would ... be charged with knowledge thereof without the
necessity of additional notice." Id.
The Sullivan court's guidelines for determining when an emergency situation exists are
similar to statutory descriptions in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
91-A:2(II) (Supp. 1977) (emergency exists when immediate undelayed action is deemed
imperative by the agency chairperson); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.8(b)(3) (Supp. 1978)
(emergency exists when "generally unexpected circumstances ...
require immediate
consideration"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 304(5) (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (emergency exists in situations involving injury to persons or property that would be increased
if notice was required before action could be taken).
122. See 299 Minn. at 178, 217 N.W.2d at 508 (Yetka, J., concurring specially).
123. As Justice Yetka observed: "Matters of extreme importance are as likely, indeed
perhaps more likely, to come up at emergency meetings than at regular meetings." Id.
Thus, no exceptions to the notice requirement were advanced by Justice Yetka. See id.
Published notice would be necessary when feasible; otherwise, notice according to "a
method selected and incorporated in the bylaws of the public body, which method could
vary according to the size of the community and the type of public body involved" should
be given to the media was suggested by the Justice. See id.
124. See Note, The Iowa Open Meeting Act: A Lesson in Legislative Ineffectiveness,
62 IOWA L. REv. 1108, 1132-33 (1977) (noting that public officials could use emergency
exception without being required to comply with any of the limitations imposed upon
other exceptions to open meetings that were designed to limit abuses).
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ings of government bodies subject to the Minnesota Open Meeting Law
indicates a need for legislative intervention in this area. Although the
most recently proposed amendment to the law contained a general
notice provision,1' the provision was deleted before final enactment.
Nevertheless, the Legislature should consider standardizing the notice
requirements set down by the Sullivan court, rather than leaving them
within the discretion of the agencies. Furthermore, the Legislature
should consider requiring notice, perhaps along the lines of the Arkansas statute, for emergency meetings. Finally, requiring that the notice
include the subject matter of meetings would be an improvement upon
the Sullivan guidelines.' With these additions, the Sullivan court's
notice requirements would be strengthened and the Minnesota Open
Meeting Law made more effective.
E.

Exceptions

Valid arguments for exempting some government bodies and decisions from the open meeting requirement have prompted legislatures
and courts to find exceptions from open meeting laws. The most common of these exceptions permits agencies that are involved in the determination of personal rights to conduct proceedings or deliberations in
private." 7 To protect these rights, discussions among members of parole
125. See 299 Minn. at 178 & n.2, 217 N.W.2d at 508 & n.2 (Yetka, J., concurring
specially). The amendment required giving "timely and reasonable notice of all meetings." Id. at 178 n.2, 217 N.W.2d at 508 n.2 (quoting S.F. 480, 68th Minn. Legis., 1973
Sess.).
126. Several state statutes require disclosure of the subject matter of a meeting as well
as its time and place. See, e.g., TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(3A) (Vernon Cum.
Supp. 1978-1979); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 19.84(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
127. See ALA. CODE § 13-5-1 (1975) (when "character or good name of a woman or a
man is involved"); ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310(c)(2) (1976) (subjects that tend to prejudice
reputation or character of any person); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2805 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (for
matters relating to individual employment); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-18a(e), -21
(West Cum. Supp. 1979) (matters relating to individual employment); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 29, § 10004(b)(7)-(8) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (employee or student disciplinary matters);
GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3302(f) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (discussions about individual employees);
HAWAII REv. STAT. § 92-5(a)(1) (1976) (matters relating to individual employment); IDAHO
CODE § 67-2345(1)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979) (employee or student disciplinary matters); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 28A.5(l)(d)-(f), (i) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (disciplinary matters;
employee performance if reputation could be needlessly, irreparably injured; discussions
of decisions in contested cases); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4318(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (matters
relating to students, employees, or patients or residents of public institutions; confidential
business data; quasi-judicial deliberations); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 61.810(6) (Baldwin
Cum. Supp. 1978) (student or employee disciplinary matters); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§§ 15.263(8), .268(a)-(b) (Supp. 1967-1979) (deliberation of merits of certain cases; employee matters and student discipline); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.025(4) (Vernon Supp. 19531978) (discussions of individual's mental health, scholastic achievement, welfare status,
employment opportunities); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-203(2) (1978) (matters relating to
individual privacy if privacy exceeds merits of public disclosure); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-
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and pardon boards,' 8 grand'25 and petit juries,

3

0

and the judiciary""

1410(1) (1976) (closed sessions to prevent needless injury to person's reputation); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 241.030(1) (1977) (discussions of character, alleged misconduct, professional
competence, or mental and physical health of any person); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91A:3(H)(b) (Supp. 1977) (matters likely to affect adversely an individual's reputation);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-12(b)(3), (9) (West 1976) (matters relating to individual privacy
or discussions leading to the imposition of agency penalty); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-15-1(E)
(Cum. Supp. 1979) (adjudicatory matters or personnel matters); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143318.3(b) (Supp. 1978) (employee or student disciplinary matters); OHiO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 121.22(G)(1) (Page 1978) (discipline of employees, students, or any other "regulated
individuals"); OKLA.STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 307 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (employee or
student disciplinary matters); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.660(1)(a)-(b) (1977) (individual employee matters or complaints); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 263 (PurdoA Cum. Supp. 19791980) (employee discipline); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-46-5(a)(1) (1977) (discussions relating
to the job performance, character, physical ormental health of any person); S.C. CODE §
30-4-70(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (individual employment matters); S.D. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. § 1-25-2 (1974) (student discipline or employee matters); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 6252-17(2)(g)-(h) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (employee or student disciplinary
matters); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 313(a)(3)-(4) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (discipline of employees); VA. CODE § 2.1-344(a)(1) to (la), (3) (1979) (employee or student disciplinary matters; matters affecting individual privacy that are unrelated to public business); W. VA.
CODE § 6-9A-4 (1979) (employee discipline and other employment matters that affect
reputation); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.85(1)(f) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (any discussions
that may impact upon reputation of any person); Wyo. STAT. § 9-11-105(a)(ii), (xi) (1977)
(discipline of employees, students, professional persons).
128. See ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310(d)(3) (1976); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10004(g)(5)
(Cum.Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3302(b) (Cum. Supp. 1978); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 61.810(1) (Baldwin Cum.Supp. 1978); Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-41-3(a) (Cum.Supp. 1978);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.025(1) (Vernon Supp. 1953-1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.4(3)
(Supp. 1978); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(D) (Page 1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.690(1)
(1977); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-1 7 (2 )(p) (Vernon Cum.Supp. 1978-1979); VA.
CODE § 2.1-345(6) (1979); Wvo. STAT. § 9-11-105(a)(vi) (1977).
A related exception for criminal investigations is recognized in roughly a quarter of the
states. See DEL.CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10004(b)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (any law enforcement
agency when collecting information); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3302(c) (1975) (state bureau of
investigation and any other law enforcement agency); IOWA CODE ANN. § 28A.5(1)(g)-(h)
(West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (any law enforcement agency's discussions of matters which
if disclosed could lead to avoidance of detection or disregard of the law); MAss. GEN. LAWS
1
ANN. ch. 30A, § 11A /2 (West 1979) (investigation of criminal misconduct or complaints);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 25-41-3(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (all law enforcement officials); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 610.025(3) (Vernon Supp. 1953-1978) (state militia or national guard); NEB. REv.
STAT. § 84-1410(1)(c) (1976) (investigations of criminal misconduct); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
10:4-7 (West 1976) (state commission of investigation); N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 100(1)(c)
(McKinney Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (matters relating to criminal investigations if imperiled by disclosure); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.4(5) (Supp. 1978) (all law enforcement
agencies); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-46-5(a)(4) (1977) (investigation into charges of criminal or
civil misconduct); S.C. CODE § 30-4-70(a)(4) (Cum.Supp. 1978) (investigations into alleged criminal conduct); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 313(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (state
prosecutions unless "premature general public knowledge" would substantially disadvantage state interests); VA. CODE § 2.1-345(6) (1979) (state crime commission); WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 19.85(1)(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (considerations of strategy for crime
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have been excepted from the requirement to meet in public.
In Minnesota, the state board of pardons and the corrections board
were expressly excluded from the Minnesota Open Meeting Law.' 32 A
less specific exception was afforded agencies, boards, and commissions,
otherwise subject to the law, "when exercising quasi-judicial functions
detection or prevention); Wyo. STAT. § 9-11-105(a)(i) (1977) (investigations of threats to
security or rights of public access).
129. See ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310(d)(2) (1976) (juries); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §
10004(g)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, § 42 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp.
1979); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 61.810(4) (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1978); Miss. CODE ANN. §
25-41-3(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978) ("all jury deliberations"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-15-1(E)
(Cum. Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.4(6) (1978); VA. CODE § 2.1-345(6) (1979).
130. See ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310(d)(2) (1976) (juries); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2805
(Cum. Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10004(g)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 102, § 42 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.810(4)
(Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1978); Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-41-3(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978) ("all jury
deliberations"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.025(1) (Vernon Supp. 1953-1978) (jury deliberations toward a verdict); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.4(6) (1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
121.22(D) (Page 1978); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(2)(d) (Vernon Cum. Supp.
1978-1979); VA. CODE § 2.1-345(6) (1979).
131. See ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310(d)(1) (1976) (excludes judicial and quasi-judicial
bodies when engaged in decisionmaking); Aiuz. REy. STAT. ANN. § 38-431(5) (Cum. Supp.
1978-1979) (judiciary excluded from definition of quasi-judicial bodies that are included);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-18a(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (judiciary excluded except for
administrative functions); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10004(g)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (deliberations of any court); HAWAII REy. STAT. § 92-6(a) (1976) (judicial and certain adjudicatory functions excluded); IDAHO CODE § 67-2341(3)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979) (courts excluded
from definition of "public agency"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4318(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978)
(excludes quasi-judicial deliberations); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.805(2) (Baldwin Cur.
Supp. 1978) (judicial and quasi-judicial bodies excluded from definition of bodies affected); MICH. COMP. LAwS ANN. § 15.263(7) (Supp. 1967-1979) (judiciary when not engaged in rulemaking or administration; section held unconstitutional as violation of separation of powers in In re 1976 PA 267, 400 Mich. 660, 255 N.W.2d 635 (1977)); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 610.025(1) (Vernon Supp. 1953-1978) (votes of judges); NEB. REy. STAT. § 841409(1) (1976) (judiciary excluded except when deliberating toward administrative orders
or when exercising rulemaking powers); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-7 (West 1976) (excludes
judiciary); N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAw § 103(1) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (excludes
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 304(1) (West Cum.
Supp. 1978-1979) (excludes judiciary); R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-46-5(c) (1977) (excludes judiciary and quasi-judicial bodies); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 312(e) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (judicial
and quasi-judicial excluded); W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-2(6) (1979) (judiciary excluded from
definition of body); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 19.85(1)(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (deliberations following judicial or quasi-judicial trials); WYo. STAT. § 9-11-102(a)(ii) (1977) (judiciary excluded).
The exception for the judiciary may be constitutionally required. In In re 1976 PA 267,
400 Mich. 660, 255 N.W.2d 635 (1977), the Michigan Supreme Court sua sponte declared
that the application of the Michigan Open Meetings Act to the judiciary unconstitutionally infringed upon the separation of powers clause of the state constitution. Legislative intrusion into the administrative or rulemaking powers of the judiciary could not be
tolerated.
132. See MINN. STAT. § 471.705(1) (1978).
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involving disciplinary proceedings.'3 The latter exception was narrowly drawn. Only when the agency engages in disciplinary proceedings
may meetings involving the exercise of quasi-judicial powers be closed
to the public. The exception does not permit an agency to meet .in
private simply because it is engaged in a quasi-judicial activity.
The narrow exception for quasi-judicial activities recognized by the
Minnesota law affords sufficient protection of the rights involved. A
disciplinary proceeding, if conducted in public, may significantly injure
the reputation of the affected party.' 34 The Florida Supreme Court, however, was not persuaded that closed sessions were necessary to the proper conduct of disciplinary proceedings.' 35 A county school board was
required to open its disciplinary proceedings on the ground that, as a
part of the legislative branch of government, the school board was subject to the Florida sunshine law, despite the characterization of its activities as quasi-judicial.' 36 The Florida Supreme Court's decision appears
to emphasize the agency's position in government over the nature of its
activities. In Minnesota, however, the law mandates recognition of the
activity and not the branch of government to which the agency belongs.
Moreover, at least in the limited context of pupil expulsion or teacher
dismissal, closed hearings are directed by statute, although the affected
pupil or teacher may demand an open hearing.' 7 Persons subject to the
disciplinary powers of other agencies have no similar right to open hearings under the Minnesota Open Meeting Law. '3 Due process, however,
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Kalil, supra note 105, at 77 (private sessions to consider employee performance also increases morale); Markham, supra note 105, at 475-78; Wickham, supra
note 5, at 485 (noting public has a "persistent fear that reputations can be unfairly
maligned during a public investigation").
135. See Canney v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 278 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973) (4-3 decision).
The issue was whether the school board was required to reach its decision in public, see
id. at 262, not whether the board was required to hear the case in public.
136. See id. at 263. A contrary decision, the court stated, would violate the separation
of powers doctrine. Id. at 263-64.
137. See Head v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 296 Minn. 267, 276-77, 208 N.W.2d 294,
299-300 (1973) (rejecting argument that determinations of teacher status by a school board
are subject to open meeting law; finding clear legislative intent to leave decision to open
meeting to teacher involved); MINN. STAT. § 125.17(7) (1978) ("All hearings before the
school board shall be private or may be public at the decision of the teacher against whom
such charges have been filed."); id. § 127.31(5) ("The hearing shall be closed unless the
pupil, parent or guardian requests an open hearing.").
138. In several states, the open meeting laws contain provisions permitting persons
subject to agency hearings, usually employees who are being disciplined, to demand public
hearings when the statutes otherwise permit closed sessions. See ALAsKA STAT. §
44.62.310(c)(2) (1976) (any person subject to agency jurisdiction may demand open hearing); Aiuz. REy. STAT. ANN. § 38-431.03(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (employees); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-18a(e) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (employees); GA. CODE ANN. § 403303(f)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (employees); HAWAn REv. STAT. § 92-5(a)(1) (1976) (employ-
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may entitle these persons to an open hearing.'3 The Minnesota law,
however, does not require disciplinary proceedings to be conducted in
private; it merely exempts them from having to be public.'4 , A person
subject to discipline therefore is not barred from demanding an open
hearing under the law and should be granted the option of a public
hearing. A clarifying amendment to the Minnesota law would foreclose
controversy on this issue. The exception for quasi-judicial proceedings
could be limited to deliberations following the receipt of evidence in
public hearings, akin to court proceedings.' 4 ' Impartiality and fairness
would be preserved by such a limitation without upsetting the open
meeting principle.
Another exception, similar to the quasi-judicial exception, has been
found for discussions between public agencies and their attorneys.
Twenty-three state statutes contain express recognition of the exception."' Four other states have addressed the exception judicially. One
ees); IOWA CODE ANN. § 28A.5(1)(e), (i) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (any affected person); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4319(b)(5) (1977) (any affected person); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 61.810(6) (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1978) (employees or students); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
42:6.1(A)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (any affected person); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
30, § 11A 2 (West 1979) (employees or students); MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 15.268(a)-(b)
(Supp. 1967-1979) (employees or students); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-203(2) (1978) (exception for matters of individual privacy may be waived by person affected); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 84-1410(1) (1976) (any affected person); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:3(II)(c) (Supp.
1977) (employees or students); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-12(b)(8) (West 1976) (employees);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-15-1(E) (Cum. Supp. 1979) (any aggrieved person); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 121.22(G)(1) (Page 1978) (employees, students, or any "regulated individual"); OR.
REV. STAT. § 192.660(1)(b) (1977) (employees); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-46-5(a)(1) (1977) (any
affected person); S.C. CODE § 30-4-70(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (employees); TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(2)(g)-(h) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (employees, students, or parents of students); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 313(a)(3)-(4) (Cum. Supp. 1978)
(employees); W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-4 (1979) (employees or students); WIs. STAT. ANN. §
19.85(1)(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (employees); WYo. STAT. § 9-11-105(a)(ii)
(1977) (professional persons or employees).
139. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (due process
required hearing on employee discharge to be open to press and public); cf. Pechter v.
Lyons, 441 F. Supp. 115, 119-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (abuse of discretion for immigration
judge to close deportation hearing).
140. See MINN. STAT. § 471.705(1) (1978) ("This section shall not apply to any . . .
agency . . . when exercising quasi-judicial functions involving disciplinary proceedings.").
141. In several states, the exception for quasi-judicial meetings has been so limited. See
ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310(d)(1) (1976) (discussions of quasi-judicial decisions); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 11126 (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (deliberations or discussions after public hearing
closed); IowA CODE ANN. § 28A.5(1)(f) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (discussions of decisions in contested cases); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-12(b)(9) (West 1976) (deliberations
leading to imposition of agency penalties); W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-2(4) (1979) (discussions
of quasi-judicial decisions); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.85(1)(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980)
(deliberations after judicial or quasi-judicial hearings).
142. See 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 250, 253 n.31 (1978).
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declined to adopt it,"3 but the other three recognized the need for the
exception.'
Minnesota's law omits a provision recognizing an attorney-client exception to the open meeting requirement. In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Housing & Redevelopment Authority,'45 the Minnesota Supreme Court judicially adopted the exception.'" The court ostensibly
based its decision on two statutes'4 7 defining the attorney-client privilege that indicated to the court "a legislative intent to preserve attorneyclient confidences."" 18s A literal application of these statutes to the open
meeting law would have resulted in an absolute exception for all discussions between a public body and its attorney.'" The Minneapolis Star
court, however, limited the scope of the exception to discussions concerning pending or prospective litigation.'50 Thus, the exception can be
invoked only to discuss litigation matters. Meetings between a public
agency and its attorneys in which general legal matters are discussed are
not encompassed by the Minneapolis Star exception and must be conducted in public.' 5'
The Minnesota court's exception for meetings between a public
143. See Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968). The court stated that
by providing within the statute that exceptions must be enumerated "specifically" by law,
the Arkansas Legislature clearly mandated its intent. Id. at 405-06, 432 S.W.2d at 755-56
(emphasis in original). The court regarded the attorney-client privilege as a "testimonial
disqualification" that did not extend to discussions between the public body and its
attorney. See id. at 406, 432 S.W.2d at 756. The same argument was advanced by the
plaintiffs in Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors, 263
Cal. App. 2d 41, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1968). The court rejected the argument as "too narrow"
a view of the privilege. See id. at 53, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 489. The privilege, according to the
California court, assured that the client would make full disclosure to an attorney
"unfettered by fear that others will be informed." Id.
144. See Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors, 263
Cal. App. 2d 41, 51-59, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480, 487-92 (1968); Times Publishing Co. v. Williams,
222 So. 2d 470, 475-76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Port of Seattle v. Rio, 16 Wash. App.
718, 724-25, 559 P.2d 18, 22-23 (1977).
145. 310 Minn. 313, 251 N.W.2d 620 (1976), noted in 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 250
(1978).
146. See 310 Minn. at 323, 251 N.W.2d at 625.
147. See MINN. STAT. § 595.02(2) (1978) (attorney incompetent to testify about any
professional communications made to client without client's consent); id. § 481.06(5)
(attorney's duties include duty to "[kjeep inviolate the confidences of his client").
148. 310 Minn. at 318, 251 N.W.2d at 623.
149. See Holmes & Graven, Of Open Meeting Laws, Attorney-Client Privilegesand the
Government Lawyer, 33 BENCH & B. MINN. 25, 27 (Feb. 1977) (noting that the court's
limiting the privilege to meetings at which pending or prospective litigation is discussed
indicates the constitutional basis for the decision).
150. See 310 Minn. at 323-24, 251 N.W.2d at 625-26.
151. See id. at 323-24, 251 N.W.2d at 626 ("The attorney-client exception discussed
herein would almost never extend to the mere request for general legal advice or opinion
by a public body in its capacity as a public agency.").
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agency and its attorneys, by attempting to balance the legitimate interests of the agency with the people's right to be informed, is sufficiently
broad to enable agencies to secure legal advice in matters in which
privacy in communications is necessary without being so broad as to
lead to abuses.
The need of public agencies for privacy has been the basis for other
exceptions, such as discussions related to public security.'5 Probably
more frequently utilized, however, are exemptions for meetings in which
land acquisition 3 or labor contracts'" are involved. The need for pri152. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11126, 54957 (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (national security);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-402(2.3)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (security arrangements when
disclosure could be used to commit violation of law); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-18a(e)
(West Cum. Supp. 1979) (security matters); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10004(b)(11) (Cum.
Supp. 1978) (potential or actual emergencies affecting public peace, health, or welfare);
HAWAII REv. STAT. § 92-5(a)(5) (1976) (sensitive matters of public safety or security); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 102, § 42 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1979) (public institutions of higher
education may discuss campus security or staff or student safety in closed sessions); IND.
CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-6(a)(ii) (Bums Cum. Supp. 1978) (implementation of security systems); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:6.1 (A)(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (discussions of security
personnel, plans, or devices); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 30A, § 11A1/2 (West 1979) (deployment of security personnel or devices); NEn. REv. STAT. § 84-1410(1)(b) (1976) (deployment of security personnel or devices); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-12(b)(6) (West 1976)
(discussions of tactics or techniques used in protecting public safety or property if disclosure would impair protection); N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAw § 100(1)(a) (McKinney Cum. Supp.
1978-1979) (public safety); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 121.22(G)(6) (Page 1978) (if disclosure
could lead to circumvention of law); R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-46-5(a)(3) (1977) (security
matters); S.C. CODE § 30-4-70(a)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (development of security personnel or devices); TEx, REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(2)(j) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 19781979) (deployment or implementation of security personnel or devices); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 1, § 313(a)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1978) ("clear and imminent peril to the public safety");
W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-4 (1979) (war, civil insurrection, riot, or development of security
personnel or devices); WYo. STAT. § 9-11-105(a)(iv) (1977) (national security).
153. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-402(2.3)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (if disclosure would
give "unfair competitive or bargaining advantage" to adverse party); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 1-18a(e) (West Cum. Supp. 1978) (if disclosure would cause increase in price); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10004(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (preliminary discussions on acquisition); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3303(d) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (future acquisitions); HAWAII RV.
STAT. § 92-5(a)(2) (1976) (negotiations of land acquisitions); IDAHO CODE § 67-2345(1)(c)
(Cum. Supp. 1979) (acquisition of any interest in real property); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102,
§ 42 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1979) (real estate acquisitions); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-141.5-6(a)(ii) (Burns Cum. Supp. 1978) (if competition requires secrecy); IOWA CODE ANN. §
28A.5(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (if disclosure would cause increase in price); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 75-4319(b)(6) (1977) (preliminary discussions); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
61.810(2) (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1978) (if disclosure would affect value); MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 30A, § 11A/2 (West 1979) (if disclosure would be detrimental to negotiating
position); MICH. CoM. LAws ANN. § 15.268(d) (Supp. 1967-1979) (purchase or lease of real
property); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.025(2) (Vernon Supp. 1953-1978) (lease, purchase, or sale
of real property if public knowledge would adversely affect value); NEB. REV. STAT. § 841410(1)(a) (1976) (real estate purchases); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:3(ll)(d) (Supp.
1977) (if disclosure would benefit adverse party); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-12(b)(5) (West
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vacy in these matters is justified by the possibility that the costs of land
and labor will be increased if public bodies are required to discuss their
strategies in public. 515 Persuaded by this reasoning, the Florida Supreme
1976) (real estate acquisitions); N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAw § 100(1)(h) (McKinney Cum. Supp.
1978-1979) (only if value would be affected by disclosure); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
143.318.3(a)(1) (Supp. 1978) (real estate acquisitions); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
121.22(G)(2) (Page 1978) (if unfair competitive or bargaining advantage would be given
to adverse party); OR. REv. STAT. § 192.660(2)(a) (1977) (negotiations); R.I. GEN. LAws §
42-46-5(a)(5) (1977) (acquisition or lease of real property if disclosure would be detrimental to public interest); S.C. CODE § 30-4-70(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (proposed sale or
purchase of property); TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(2)(f) (Vernon Cum. Supp.
1978-1979) (if disclosure would be detrimental to government negotiating position); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 313(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (real estate acquisitions); VA. CODE §
2.1-344(a)(2) (1979) (acquisition or use for public purpose; future plans for state universities if disclosure would affect value); W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-4 (1979) (if disclosure would
have adverse effect on financial or other government interest); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
19.85(1)(e) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (real estate acquisitions); WYo. STAT. § 9-11105(a)(vii) (1977) (if disclosure would cause increase in price).
154. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-431.03(A)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (discussions
with employee representatives relating to compensation of employees); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ § 11126, 54957.6 (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (discussions with employee representatives or
agency representatives relating to compensation agreements); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6402(2.3)(e) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (strategy sessions for employment negotiations); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-18a(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (collective bargaining sessions); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10004(b)(9) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (collective bargaining sessions);
HAWAII REv. STAT. § 92-5(a)(2) (1976) (labor negotiations); IDAHO CODE § 67-2345(1)(c),
(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979) (labor negotiations if either side requests closed session); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 102, § 42 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1979) (collective bargaining sessions); IND.
CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-6(a)(ii) (Burns Cum. Supp. 1978) (collective bargaining sessions);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4319(b)(3) (1977) (consultations with agency representatives in
employee negotiations); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.810(5) (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1978)
(collective bargaining sessions); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42:6.1(A)(2) (West Cum. Supp.
1979) (collective bargaining sessions); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 30A, § 11A/2 (West 1979)
(collective bargaining strategy sessions if open sessions would be detrimental to agency
position); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 15.268(c) (Supp. 1967-1979) (collective bargaining
negotiations); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-203(3) (1978) (collective bargaining strategy sessions); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-12(b)(4), (b)(8) (West 1976) (collective bargaining sessions);
N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 100(1)(e) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (collective bargaining
sessions); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.3(a)(2) (Supp. 1978) (negotiations between agency
and employees or employee representatives); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(G)(4) (Page
1978) (negotiations with employees concerning compensation or terms and conditions of
employment); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 307 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (negotiations
with employee representatives); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 263 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 19791980) (actions of agency with respect to labor negotiations); R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-46-5(a)(2)
(1977) (collective bargaining sessions); TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(2)(m) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (discussing standards for conducting labor negotiations with
agency representatives); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.82(1), .85(1)(c) (West Cum. Supp. 19791980) (collective bargaining sessions, considerations of employment matters). See
generally Comment, Public Sector Collective Bargainingand Sunshine Laws-A Needless
Conflict, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 159 (1976) (analyzing the rights of individual employees
and minority employees to speak at open bargaining sessions).
155. See Wickham, supra note 5, at 486 (noting that land costs may increase); Effects
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Court concluded that labor negotiators hired by a public agency could
conduct preliminary contract talks with representatives of a public
employee labor organization in private without violating the state open
meeting law.M On the other hand, open meetings may be necessary to
prevent the possibility of collusion between public officers and labor
representatives during collective bargaining sessions.'57 Similarly, as one
commentator has rather cynically suggested, secret sessions to discuss
land acquisition can give public officials the opportunity to cover their
corruption. "8 Public discussions of such matters are not harmful, this
commentator explained, because persons who profit from public land
acquisitions usually find out about pending transactions whether the
meetings are open or closed."'
In Minnesota, these exceptions are not included in the open meeting
law and the supreme court has not judicially recognized them. In
Channel 10, Inc. v. Independent School District No. 709,160 the court
held that the school board was required to interview prospective employees for administrative positions in open sessions.1'6 The absence of
a statutory exception, the court stated, indicated that the Legislature
had determined that such discussions could not be closed.' 2 The court
also noted that the absence of a statutory exception for labor negotiations barred public agencies from meeting in private with union repre3
sentatives for the purpose of collective bargaining.
of the Minnesota Open Meeting Law, supra note 36, at 10 (noting that labor costs in 29%
of all jurisdictions surveyed increased and in 42% of the larger jurisdictions; also reporting
that land costs had not increased as result of the law).
156. See Basset v.. Braddock, 262 So. 2d 425, 426-28 (Fla. 1972). Holding that collective
bargaining sessions need not be open under the state sunshine act, the court remarked:
"Such 'intensity' of the 'sunrays' under the statute ... could cause a damaging 'sunburn'
to those employees or to the public which elected the Board." Id. at 426. The decision was
limited to preliminary discussions-formal adoption of the labor contract was required to
be conducted in public. See id. at 427. The court also held that private consultations
between the body and its hired negotiator could be held without violating the statute. See
id. at 428. Such consultations were not intended to conceal discussions but to obtain "the
best 'bargain' available." Id.
157. Cf. id. at 431 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (bad faith in collective bargaining
"emanates from closed doors").
158. See Comment, Freedom of Information in Arizona: An Antidote for Secrecy in
Government, 1975 ARIz. ST. B.J. 111, 129 ("Allowing secret sessions for land acquisition
offers opportunities for corrupt officials to more easily mask their misdeeds."); Comment,
New York Open Meeting Law: A CriticalEvaluation, 41 ALB. L. REv. 329, 346 (1977) (one
danger of allowing closed sessions in land acquisition is that "officials ... may be able
to arrange profitable private deals").
159. See Comment, Freedom of Information in Arizona: An Antidote for Secrecy in
Government, 1975 Amz. ST. B.J. 111, 129.
160. 298 Minn. 306, 215 N.W.2d 814 (1974).
161. See id. at 320-21, 215 N.W.2d at 825.
162. See id.
163. Id. at 324, 215 N.W.2d at 826-27. The court noted that following institution of the
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Similarly omitted from the Minnesota statute is a provision excluding
political party caucuses. A number of state statutes expressly exclude
such gatherings from their laws'" apparently on the ground that when
public officials meet in a party caucus, they meet as private individuals,
not as public representatives. The Minnesota Attorney General has
pointed out, however, that members of a particular party could caucus
as party members to discuss government matters and should be required
to meet in public.6 5 In such cases, caucuses must be conducted in public.
The limited number of exceptions to the Minnesota Open Meeting
Law does ensure that the public will be permitted to attend the discussions of state governmental bodies. Despite statutorily prescribed limitations on the use of closed sessions, however, officials may be tempted
to discuss matters beyond the legitimate scope of the private session. If
exceptions, such as for land acquisition discussions or labor negotiations, are to be drafted in an open meeting law, safeguards could be
included. A greater than majority vote to close meetings could be required. 6' Tape recordings of closed sessions with subsequent disclosure
suit, the Legislature had adopted a statute requiring negotiations between public employers and public employees to be conducted in public unless the director of mediation
services directs otherwise. See id. at 324 n.9, 215 N.W.2d at 827 n.9; MINN. STAT. §
179.69(2) (1978) ("All negotiations, mediation sessions, and hearings between public employers and public employees or their respective representatives shall be public meetings
except when otherwise provided by the director.").
164. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-18a(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (caucuses excluded even if a quorum of the public body); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-2(c), (h) (Bums
Cum. Supp. 1978) (caucuses excluded to discuss political strategy or to prepare for official
action); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.268(g) (Supp. 1967-1979) (partisan caucuses of the
legislature excluded); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-7 (West 1976) (political party organizations
and caucuses exempt); N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 103(2) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1978-1979)
(political committees, conferences, and caucuses exempt); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 267
(Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (caucuses exempt); W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-2(4) (1979)
(caucuses exempt).
165. See Op. Minn. Att'y Gen. 471-e (Oct. 28, 1974). But cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
1-18a(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (excepting party caucuses "notwithstanding that such
members also constitute a quorum of a public agency").
166. See Little & Tompkins, supra note 90, at 478. Several states require agencies to
take official action before convening in executive sessions. One state permits closed sessions only upon a three-fifths vote of the members of the agency. See Miss. CODE ANN. §
25-41-7 (Cum. Supp. 1978). Seven states have a two-thirds vote requirement. See COLO.
REv. STAT. § 24-6-402(2.3), (2.7) (Cum. Supp. 1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21 (West
Cum. Supp. 1979); IDAHO CODE § 67-2345(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. §
28A.5(1)-(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980); MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 15.267(1) (Supp.
1967-1979); OR. REv. STAT. § 192.660(2) (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 313(a)-(b) (Cum.
Supp. 1978). More commonly, however, a simple majority is required. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 44.62.310(b) (1976); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10004(c) (Cum. Supp. 1978); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 61.815 (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1978); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 11A1/2
(West 1979); NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1410(1)-(2) (1976); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:3(l)-
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of the tape, minutes, and any relevant documents could be an alternate
method of safeguarding against abuses.'67 Any exception, whatever safeguards are provided, must be balanced with the public's need for information and the benefits to be derived from public input into governmental decisionmaking. Without a sufficient reason for an exception, none
should be permitted to upset the open meeting principle.
F.

Enforcement

Articulating the principle that meetings of government bodies should
be open to the public takes less effort than formulating methods of
enforcing that idea. One difficulty faced when attempting to design
effective enforcement methods is that open meeting laws can be violated
with relative ease. Although blatant violations, such as closing formal
meetings, are simple to detect and to guard against, less obvious violations may go undiscovered. Seeking to ensure that public officials will
comply with open meeting laws, legislatures have adopted various
methods of enforcement." 8 The imposition of civil 6 ' or criminal penalties' 70 are a common sanction against violations. Injunctive relief also is
(II) (Supp. 1977); N.Y. PuB. OpF. LAW § 100 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143-318.3(a) (Supp. 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 307 (West Cum. Supp.
1978-1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-46-4 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.85(1) (West Cum. Supp.
1979-1980); cf. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4319(a) (1977) (requires "formal motion"); S.C. CODE
§ 30-4-70(a)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (requires public vote). A different approach is taken
by Pennsylvania, which permits closed sessions without an official vote, but limits the
period during which the agency may meet in secret to 30 minutes. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
65, § 263 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
167. See Little & Tompkins, supra note 90, at 478. The press and the public are permitted to tape record proceedings held during open meetings in Minnesota. See Op. Minn.
Att'y Gen. 63a-5 (Dec. 4, 1972).
168. See notes 173-76, 187 infra and accompanying text; cf. notes 202-03 infra and
accompanying text (listing statutes stating that actions taken in violation of law are void
or voidable).
169. See note 175 infra.
170. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-431.06 (Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (class 3 misdemeanor); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 54959 (West 1966) (misdemeanor); CONN. GE. STAT. ANN. §
1-21k (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (class B misdemeanor); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011(3) (West
Cum. Supp. 1979) (second degree misdemeanor); GA. CODE Ann. § 40-9911 (1975) (misdemeanor); HAWAn REv. STAT. § 92-13 (1976) (misdemeanor); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, § 44
(Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1979) (class C misdemeanor); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.272
(Supp. 1967-1979) (misdemeanor); NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1414(4) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (class
V misdemeanor); NEv. REV. STAT. § 241.040(1)-(2) (1977) (misdemeanor to attend meetings held in violation of law or to wrongfully exclude any person from a meeting); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 10-15-4 (1978) (misdemeanor); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-19 (1978) (guilty of
infraction for first offense); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 314 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979)
(misdemeanor); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 268 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (summary
offense); S.C. CODE § 30-4-110 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (misdemeanor); S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN.
§ 1-25-5 (1974) (misdemeanor); TEx. Rav. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(4) (Vernon Cum.
Supp. 1978-1979) (misdemeanor); W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-7 (1979) (misdemeanor); notes 17374, 177-86 infra and accompanying text.
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made available for possible or continuing violations. 7' A more drastic
method of enforcement is provided by statutes that call for the invalidation of actions taken at illegal meetings.'72 The scope of these remedies
is discussed below.
1. Actions Against Public Officers-Civil
and Criminal Penalties and Removal
The possibility of personal penalties being assessed against public
officials who violate open meeting laws may have a significant deterrent
effect. Accordingly, many open meeting laws subject individuals guilty
of violating the laws to criminal penalties, including fines' and jail
terms,' civil fines,'75 or removal from office.'
171. See notes 187-201 infra and accompanying text.
172. See notes 202-20 infra and accompanying text.
173. See ALA. CODE § 13-5-1 (1975) (misdemeanor offense punishable by fine between
$10 and $500; those who remain in closed meetings deemed guilty of a violation); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 12-2807 (1968) (willful and knowing violations are misdemeanors punishable
by fine up to $200 or jail term up to 30 days or both); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-9911 (1975) (up
to $100 fine); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42:9(B) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (fine between $100
and $1000 for first offense; between $250 and $2000 for subsequent offenses); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 15.272 (Supp. 1967-1979) (fine of $1000 for first offense; $2000 or one year
imprisonment for second offense committed during same term); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:417 (West 1976) (fine of $100 for first offense; $100 to $500 for subsequent offenses); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 10-15-4 (1978) (fine up to $100); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 314 (West Cum.
Supp. 1978-1979) (fine up to $500, one year imprisonment, or both); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
65, § 268 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (fine up to $100 plus costs of prosecution); S.C.
CODE § 30-4-110 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (fine up to $100 or 30 days in jail for first offense;
$200 fine or 60 days, for second offense; $300 fine or 90 days, for subsequent offenses); TEx.
REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(4) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (fine between $100
and $500 or one to six months in jail or both); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 314 (1972) (fine up
to $500); W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-7 (1979) (fine between $100 and $500 or ten days in jail);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 19.96 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (fine between $25 and $300 for each
offense).
174. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2807 (1968) (fine or 20-day jail term or both); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 42:9(B) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (jail term up to seven days for first offense,
30 days for subsequent offenses); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 314 (West Cum. Supp. 19781979) (misdemeanor, jail term not to exceed one year); S.C. CODE § 30-4-100 (Cum. Supp.
1978) (fine plus 30-day jail term for first offense, 60-day term for second offense, 90-day
term for subsequent offenses); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(4) (Vernon Cum.
Supp. 1978-1979) (fine plus one to six months jail term); W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-7 (1979)
(fine plus 10-day jail term).
175. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21i(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (fine of $20 to $500
may be imposed); IowA CODE ANN. § 28A.6(3)(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (court may
impose $100 to $500 fine on members who have attended closed sessions unless member
voted against meeting in closed session, acted in good faith in supporting closed session,
or relied on court or attorney general opinion as authority for closed session); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-4320(a) (1977) (fine up to $500 may be imposed for knowing violations); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.273(1) (Supp. 1967-1979) (fine up to $500 may be imposed as well
as costs and attorney's fees incurred by successful plaintiff); VA. CODE § 2.1-346.1 (1979)
(fine of $25 to $500 may be imposed for willful violations).
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The effectiveness of criminal penalties as an enforcement device in
open meeting laws, however, is questionable. Criminal penalties in open
meeting laws are seldom, if ever, enforced due to the reluctance of prosecutors to bring charges against fellow politicians,'77 the difficulty of
proving intent to violate what are frequently vague statutes, 7 8 and the
feeling that open meeting violations are not serious enough to warrant
criminal penalties."' In fact, criminal penalties may have a negative
effect on open meeting laws by delaying clarification of vague or ambiguous statutes because, fearful of possible exposure to criminal proceedings, public officials are unwilling to test the statutes. 80 Civil penalties
are a more effective method of enforcement because enforcement is not
dependent upon prosecutorial discretion.' Removal from office, in one
commentator's opinion, is the most effective sanction against open
meeting violations. 2 Although the public can deal with some open
meeting violators through the electoral process, removal provides more
immediate relief that is effective against appointed as well as elected
officials.
In 1973, the Minnesota Legislature added an enforcement provision
to the Minnesota law that imposes civil penalties upon officials who
violate the law and requires their removal in certain cases. 83 Violators
may be assessed a civil penalty of up to $100 for each violation, which
any person may enforce by bringing an action "in any court of competent jurisdiction where the administrative office of the governing body
is located.' ' 1 4 An official who violates the law three times as a member
176. See HAWAII Rnv. STAT. § 92-13 (1976) (summary removal possible after first conviction); IOWA CODE ANN. § 28A.6(3)(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (removal available for
two violations during one term); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 121.22(H) (Page 1978) (knowing
violation of injunction may lead to removal).
177. See 49 TEx. L. REv. 764, 773 (1971).
178. See Comment, supra note 7, at 1178.
179. See id. at 1178-79.
180. See Kalil, supra note 105, at 78. In Knight v. Iowa Dist. Court, 269 N.W.2d 430
(Iowa 1978), the Iowa Supreme Court struck down the penal provisions of the Iowa open
meeting law as violative of the vagueness doctrine. See id. at 434. The law failed to define
the individual conduct that was prohibited; it merely referred to the requirement that
meetings of government bodies must be open to the public. See id. at 433. The defendants
had been charged with "participation" in a closed meeting, but that conduct was not
prohibited by the statute and could be applied not only to members of the public body
but also to any witness speaking before the body at the closed meeting. See id. Because
it was unclear what type of individual conduct was unlawful under the statute, its penal
provisions would not be enforced. See id.
181. See Comment, New York Open Meeting Law: A CriticalEvaluation, 41 ALB. L.
REV. 329, 349 (1977); Comment, supra note 62, at 269.
182. See Wickham, supra note 5, at 499.
183. See Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 680, § 1, 1973 Minn. Laws 1834, 1835 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 471.705(2) (1978)).
184. MINN. STAT. § 471.705(2) (1978).
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of the same government body may be removed from office and forfeit
the right to serve with that body for a period equal to the official's term
of office. 8 5 The statute does not specify the standing or jurisdictional
requirements for enforcing the removal provision.
Coupling a civil penalty with a removal provision, as the Minnesota
statute does, provides a strong deterrent to official misconduct regarding open meeting laws. Removal from office may be a drastic remedy,
but the Minnesota law's requirement of three violations before removal
reduces the possibility of unfairness. An official who commits three
8
violations can hardly say that his or her actions were inadvertant.1
The practical effect of these enforcement provisions in the Minnesota
law is difficult to gauge. No decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court
have discussed their application. Perhaps the absence of case law indicates that the enforcement provisions are deterring violations. On the
other hand, the lack of opinions may suggest that the enforcement provisions are perceived to be too weak to be of much value or effect. Other
methods of enforcing the law may provide a more effective control:
2. Injunctive Relief
Many open meeting laws specify that injunctive relief is available to
compel compliance with the law and forestall repeated violations. 8 1 In
185. See id.
186. The law requires three violations, not convictions, before removal is permitted.
Theoretically, a public official could be removed from office without previously having
been subject to criminal or civil sanctions; all three violations could be proved in the suit
for removal. Moreover, the law does not indicate whether a public official who has technically violated the law but has done so in good faith should be subject to the same sanctions
as a public official who has willfully violated the law.
187. See ARnz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-431.04 (1974) (mandamus available if provisions
not followed); CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11130, 54960 (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (any person may
seek injunctive or declaratory relief against actual or threatened violations); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 29, § 10005 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (any citizen may seek declaratory judgment, writ
of mandamus, or other appropriate relief); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3301(b) (Cum. Supp. 1978)
(any citizen may seek injunctive relief); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, § 43 (Smith-Hurd Cune.
Supp. 1979) (injunctive relief available upon probable cause that violation has or will
occur); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-7(a) (Burns Cum. Supp. 1978) (any citizen may seek to
enjoin threatened or future violations); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4320(a) (1977) (injunction
and mandamus are available); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 61.845 (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1978)
(any citizen may seek to enforce purposes of law by injunction or other order); LA. Rv.
STAT. ANN. § 42:10 (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (person denied right to attend meeting may
sue to require compliance or to prevent further violations); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 30A,
§ 11AI/2 (West 1979) (three or more voters, attorney general, or prosecuting attorneys may
seek to require future compliance); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 15.271 (Supp. 1967-1979)
(any person may sue to enjoin further noncompliance with act); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2541-15 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (any person may seek injunctive relief or mandamus); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 610.030 (Vernon Supp. 1953-1978) (injunctive relief available); NEB. , v. STAT. §
84-1414(3) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (any citizen may sue to require compliance or prevent
future violations); NEv. RE. STAT. § 241.040(5) (1977) (person denied rights under act
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practice, however, the remedy has been limited by statutes that require
proof of a prior violation before an injunction will issue. '8 A Florida
court, however, has indicated that injunctive relief would be appropriate
upon a strong showing that a violation is about to occur."" This lesser
standard is more reasonable because, as the Florida court stated, no
adequate remedy at law is available for persons aggrieved by violations
of open meeting statutes. 00
Injunctive relief, of course, is of little effect once a violation has occurred, but it can prevent further violations.' 9' Furthermore, the threat
of holding officials in contempt for failing to obey the injunction should
deter violations.I?1 Because relief is prospective, injunctions also afford
3
courts an opportunity for clarifying open meeting statutes.'
The availability of injunctive relief under the Minnesota law was
recognized in Channel 10, Inc. v. Independent School DistrictNo. 709.191
may seek compliance); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:7 (Supp. 1977) (any aggrieved person
may sue for injunctive relief); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-16 (West 1976) (injunctive relief
available); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-15-3(B) (1978) (any group of five citizens may obtain
injunctive relief upon good cause); N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 102(1) (McKinney Cum. Supp.
1978-1979) (declaratory and injunctive relief available); OHIO Ray. CODE ANN. § 121.22(H)
(Page 1978) (any person may seek injunctive relief upon proof of violation or threatened
violation); OR. REv. STAT. § 192.680(1) (1977) (injunctive relief available for any affected
person); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 269 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (any person may
seek injunctive relief or other appropriate remedies); R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-46-8 (Cum.
Supp. 1978) (any person may seek injunctive relief or judicial review); S.C. CODE § 30-4100(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (any citizen may seek relief if violation has occurred or agency
has ratified action within 60 days of suit); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4406(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978)
(injunctive relief available); TEX. Rzv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(3) (Vernon Cum.
Supp. 1978-1979) (any interested person may seek injunctive relief to prevent present or
threatened violations); VA. CODE § 2.1-346 (1979) (person denied rights may seek injunctive relief; single denial sufficient to invoke remedy); W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-6 (Supp. 1979)
(any citizen who shows good faith and valid reason may seek injunctive relief); WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 19.97(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (injunctive and declaratory relief available); cf. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2806 (1968) (any citizen may seek judicial review of denial
of rights; scope of review and relief available not stated in act).
188. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 30A, § 11AI/2 (West 1979) (may seek relief to
require future compliance with act); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 15.271 (Supp. 1967-1979)
(further noncompliance with act may be enjoined); NEV. REv. STAT. § 241.040(5) (1977)
(only persons denied rights may seek relief).
189. See Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470, 476-77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1969) (when threat to meet in violation of open meeting law is "real and imminent,"
injunctive relief is available "since there obviously is no adequate remedy at law"). Statutes in a few states have similar standards. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 54960 (West Cum.
Supp. 1979) (injunctive relief available against "actions or threatened future actions");
IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-7(a) (Burns Cum. Supp. 1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
42.30.130 (1972).
190. See 222 So. 2d at 476-77.
191. See Comment, supra note 7, at 1179.
192. See Note, supra note 3, at 1215; Comment, supra note 7, at 1180.
193. See Note, supra note 3, at 1215.
194. 298 Minn. 306, 314-18, 215 N.W.2d 814, 821-24 (1974).
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Although other courts have been reluctant to enjoin open meeting violations without statutory authority,"95 the Minnesota court regarded injunctive relief as an appropriate method of effectuating the legislative
intent that the statute be enforced, despite the absence of any specific
enforcement provisions."'
Standing to seek the injunction authorized by the Channel 10 court
was not limited to traditional grounds. Injunctive relief usually has been
available to vindicate a public interest only when a private plaintiff has
suffered or may suffer a personal injury, economic or otherwise, caused
by the conduct to be enjoined." 7 The Channel 10 court, however, pointing to the trend toward broadening standing rights, held that a television station and its news director could seek an injunction against a
school board's violations of the open meeting law.' 8 Although recognizing the station's economic interest in the generation of news, the court
based its decision on the implication in the statute that the public has
a right to be informed by the media."' In dicta, the court acknowledged
the public's right to seek injunctive relief based on the public's implicit
right to attend meetings of the bodies subject to the law.m
The decision in Channel 10 has questionable precedential value because it was rendered prior to enactment of the current enforcement
provisions in the law. The court could find these statutory remedies to
be exclusive, precluding the availability of injunctive relief. Because
injunctive relief provides an immediate method of enforcing the open
meeting law, however, it should be available to prevent pending violations. An expedited hearing procedure would ensure that injunctive relief is made available without undue delay. Furthermore, because the
costs of obtaining injunctive relief may deter enforcement, an effective
open meeting law should contain a provision permitting the assessment
of costs and attorney's fees against a violating agency.2"1 With these
195. See Note, supra note 3, at 1214.
196. See 298 Minn. at 317-18, 215 N.W.2d at 823.
197. See id. at 312-13, 215 N.W.2d at 820.
198. See id. at 313-14, 215 N.W.2d at 821.
199. See id. at 317-18, 215 N.W.2d at 823.
200. See id.
201. Several states permit successful plaintiffs to recover their costs and attorney's fees
in suits brought to enforce the statutes. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11130.5, 54960.5 (West
Cum. Supp. 1979) (agency may also recover attorney's fees and costs if suit was frivolous);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011(4)-(5) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (attorney's fees and costs may
be assessed against agencies whose actions have been invalidated; cost of appeals also
recoverable); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42:10(B) (West Cune. Supp. 1979) (agency may also
recover attorney's fees and costs if suit was frivolous); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-221 (1978);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1414(3) (Cum. Supp. 1978); NEv. Rsv. STAT. § 241.040(6) (1977);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:8 (Supp. 1977) (official who violates law is liable for attorney's fees and costs); N.Y. Pum. OFF. LAw § 102(2) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1978-1979);
OR. REV. STAT. § 192.680 (1977) (members of agency may also be liable if violation was
willful); S.C. CODE § 30-4-100(b) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (citizen who prevails in whole or in
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procedural safeguards, the law would make a firm statement in favor of
the open meeting principle.
3.

Invalidation of Actions Taken at
Closed Sessions

At first glance, invalidating actions taken at meetings held in violation of open meeting laws appears to be a reasonable method of enforcement. Through invalidation, public officials are unable to reap any benefit from their unlawful conduct and the public is not subjected to the
consequences of official decisions reached at meetings in which they
have had no voice. Several states have included provisions in their open
meeting laws stating that actions taken at illegal meetings are void 2 2 or
voidable.203
Application of this remedy, however, encounters many difficulties.
First, invalidation is only effective when some action has been taken at
part may recover proportionate share of attorney's fees and costs); VA. CODE § 2.1-346
(1979) (agency also entitled if case was clearly frivolous).
202. See ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310(f) (1976) (void); Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-431.05
(Cum. Supp. 1978) (void); COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-6-402(4) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (actions
taken in violation of statute are not "valid"); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3301(a) (Cum. Supp.
1978) (actions not "binding"); IDAHO CODE § 67-2347 (Cum. Supp. 1979) ("null and void");
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-15-3(A) (1978) (not valid); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 121.22(H) (Page
1978) (actions "invalid"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4405 (Cum. Supp. 1978) ("void and of no
effect" except for commitments affecting public debt); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 312(a)
(Cum. Supp. 1978) (no action considered "binding" if taken at meetings held in violation
of law).
203. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21i(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (freedom of information commission empowered to declare actions taken at meetings "null and void");
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10005 (Cum. Supp. 1978); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 92-11 to -12(a)
(1976) (voidable within 90 days by attorney general or prosecuting attorneys); IND. CODE
ANN. § 5-14-1.5-7(a) (Burns Cum Supp. i978) (any citizen may have actions declared
void); IowA CODE ANN. § 28A.6(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (court may void action
if interest in enforcement exceeds interest in validity; bond issues and other evidences of
indebtedness cannot be voided); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4320(a) (1977) (voidable in suit
brought by attorney general or prosecuting attorneys); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 61.830
(Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1978) (voidable); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 11A 2 (West
1979) (invalidation within 21 days of action); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.270 (Supp.
1967-1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-213 (1978) (court may declare actions void); NEB. REv.
STAT. § 84-1414(1)-(3) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (attorney general, county attorneys, or any
citizen may sue to have actions declared void); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-15(a) (West 1976);
N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 102(1) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (void upon good cause
shown); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-46-8 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (court may declare actions null and
void); W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-6 (1979) (court may annul actions within 30 days); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 19.97(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980). But see OR. REv. STAT. § 192.680(1) (1977)
(violation of law cannot be reason for voiding action). See generally Comment,
Invalidationas a Remedy for Open Meeting Violations, 53 OR. L. REv. 519 (1976) (arguing
that courts should inquire into public interest before striking down actions taken in violation of open meeting laws).
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an illegally closed meeting; deliberation cannot be nullified. 0 4 Secondly,
if an invalidation suit is brought, a public body could conceivably stage
a "rerun" session in public to moot the suit, although such attempts to
validate the illegal action should not be permitted.2 05 Third, per se invalidation may lead to the nullification of actions, albeit taken at closed
meetings, that are otherwise worthwhile.2 Finally, the public may have
relied on decisions reached in closed meetings before invalidation is
ordered. 207 In apparent recognition of public reliance on agency decisons,
legislatures have included time limits, ranging from ten days0 8 to one
year, 2 1 within which invalidation actions must be commenced."' 0
The Minnesota Open Meeting Law contains no provision authorizing
the invalidation of actions adopted at meetings held in violation of the
law. Prior to enactment of the enforcement provisions in 1973, the supreme court had addressed the issue of invalidation but without reaching any definite conclusion. In Quast v. Knutson,2 1 the court held that
an attempted consolidation of a school district was fatally defective
because the authorizing resolution was adopted at a school board meet204. See Note, supra note 124, at 1137 (noting that discussions cannot be invalidated);
Comment, supra note 62, at 270 (noting that it is impractical to invalidate deliberations).
205. See Scott v. Town of Bloomfield, 94 N.J. Super. 592, 600, 229 A.2d 667, 671 (Law
Div.) (to permit board to "re-run" vote, court would be sanctioning circumvention of open
meeting law), limited on othergrounds per curiam, 98 N.J. Super. 321, 237 A.2d 297 (App.
Div. 1967), appeal dismissed per curiam as moot, 52 N.J. 473, 246 A.2d 129 (1968). The
present law in New Jersey permits an agency to reconsider action de novo if it has been
declared invalid. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-15(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1978). This allows
retroactive ratification if the public body has reconsidered its action "completely anew,
for a second time, in full compliance with all the requirements of the Open Public Meetings Act." Houman v. Mayor and Council of Pompton Lakes, 155 N.J. Super. 129, 16062, 382 A.2d 413, 431 (Law Div. 1977). This procedure reflects two basic concerns: first,
that the public interest might be adversely affected by permanent invalidation and second, that a perfunctory rerun does not serve the public interest. See Project, supra note
34, at 1209-10.
206. See Note, supra note 3, at 1214.
207. See Comment, supra note 62, at 270.
208. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4320(a) (1977); NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1414(1) (1976).
209. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1414(1) (1976).
210. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10005 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (30 days of citizen's
learning of action but in no case later than six months after action occurred); GA. CODE
ANN. § 40-3301(a) (Cur. Supp. 1978) (90 days); HAwAii Rxv. STAT. § 92-11 (1976) (90
days); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-7(b) (Burns Cum. Supp. 1978) (30 days or before notes,
bonds, or obligations are delivered); IowA CODE ANN. § 28A.6(3)(c) (West Cum. Supp.
1979-1980) (six months); KA. STAT. ANN. § 75-4320(a) (1977) (10 days); MAss. GEN. LAwS
ANN. ch. 30A, § llAI/2 (West 1979) (21 days after action becomes public knowledge);
MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 15.270(3)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1967-1979) (60 days; 30 days, if contract
or bonds are involved); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-15(a) (West 1976) (45 days); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 42-46-8 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (30 days); W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-6 (1979) (30 days); cf. Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 19.97(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (court must balance public interest
in enforcement against public interest in the action taken before declaring action void).
211. 276 Minn. 340, 150 N.W.2d 199 (1967).
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ing held outside the territorial confines of the school district.2 1 2 Because
the meeting was not a public meeting within the open meeting law, the
court held that the actions were invalid.2 1 3 In Sullivan v. Credit River
Township,21 however, the court refused to invalidate actions taken at a
closed meeting. The court reasoned that because the law failed to provide a method of enforcement, it was a directory rather than a mandatory statute, the violation of which did not result in invalidation.2 5 The
result in Sullivan may have been influenced by the plaintiff's reliance
21
on the actions taken at the unlawful meeting. 8
Whether the Minnesota court will adhere to these opinions now that
the statute contains definite enforcement provisions is uncertain. Invalidation, like notice, however, may be implied from an open meeting law
despite, the existence of alternate remedies. 2 7 Courts in other jurisdictions, however, have reached conflicting results on whether invalidation
is an implicit remedy.21 1Many courts have refused to order invalidation
in the absence of specific statutory authorization. 214 The better result is
suggested in an opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in which
equitable or other appropriate remedies were held to be available under
an open meeting law that prescribed a civil fine as the sole penalty for
violationsY8 Because invalidation is an effective method of enforcing
open meeting legislation, Minnesota should adopt the Pennsylvania
approach.
The assessment of criminal or civil penalties, removal of offending
officials, and injunctions against continuing violations do not correct the
problem for which the remedies in an open meeting law were provided.
Invalidation, by cancelling out actions taken at illegal meetings, directly
addresses the problem and attempts to correct it by requiring agencies
to reconsider these actions in public sessions. Judicial recognition or
212. See id. at 341, 150 NW.2d at 200. The defect could have been disregarded if a
majority of the voters of the district in which the meeting was not held had approved the
resolution. Id.
213. See id.
214. 299 Minn. 170, 217 N.W.2d 502 (1974).
215. See id. at 176-77, 217 N.W.2d at 507. The court did not refer to the Quast opinion.
216. See id. at 177-78, 217 N.W.2d at 507 (plaintiff spent $10,000 in reliance on board's
grant of sanitary landfill permit).
217. See, e.g., Bogert v. Allentown Hous. Auth., 426 Pa. 151, 157, 231 A.2d 147, 150
(1967); Bigelow v. Howze, 291 So. 2d 645, 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Toyah Ind. School
Dist. v. Pecos-Barstow Ind. School Dist., 466 S.W.2d 377, 378 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
218. Compare, e.g., Bogert v. Allentown Hous. Auth., 426 Pa. 151, 157-58, 231 A.2d 147,
150 (1967) with, e.g., Adler v. City Council, 184 Cal. App. 2d 763, 774-75, 7 Cal. Rptr.
805, 812 (1960) (invalidation not a remedy when statute provides for criminal penalty to
be assessed against violators) and Dobrovolny v. Reinhardt, 173 N.W.2d 837 (Iowa 1970).
219. See, e.g., Adler v. City Council, 184 Cal. App. 2d 763, 774-75, 7 Cal. Rptr. 805,
812 (1960).
220. See Bogert v. Allentown Hous. Auth., 426 Pa. 151, 155-56, 231 A.2d 147,150 (1967).
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legislative adoption of the remedy will ensure that actions taken by
public officials will be ineffective unless conducted under the public
gaze.

mH.

CONCLUSION

This Note has focused on the Minnesota Open Meeting Law and the
interpretations given it by the Minnesota Supreme Court. Although the
statute, as presently written, contains some strong features, it could be
improved by adopting the changes suggested in this Note.
The extent to which government will be open depends in the final
analysis upon the willingness of officials to conduct the public's business
in public. This willingness is probably derived as much, if not more,
from an official's perception of his or her obligations to the public as
from his or her respect for law and fear of its penalties. Open meeting
laws are not an instant panacea for government conducted behind
closed doors. Nevertheless, to the extent that they influence the conduct
of public officials, open meeting laws are the best means that the public
has for opening closed doors and keeping them open.
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